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”Knowledge is like a river. Its nature is to constantly flow. Wherever it can flow, it
does so, nourishing culture. On the other hand, the same knowledge, if devoid of values
becomes a source of destruction for the world. When values and knowledge become
one,there can be no more powerful instrument for the welfare of humankind...”
Sri Mata Amritanandamayi Devi
Abstract
Health-care delivery in developing countries has many challenges because they do not
have enough resources for meeting the healthcare needs and they lack testing lab infras-
tructures in communities. It has been proven that Point-Of-Care (POC) testing can be
considered as one of the ways to resolve the crisis in healthcare delivery in these com-
munities. The POC testing is a mission critical processes in which the patient conduct
tests outside of laboratory environment and it needs a secure communication system of
architecture support which the research refers as POCT system
Almost every ten years there will be a new radio access technology (RAT) is released
in the wireless communication system evolution which is primarily driven by the 3GPP
standards organisation. It is challenging to develop a predictable communication sys-
tem in an environment of frequent changes originated by the 3GPP and the wireless
operators. The scalable and expandable network architecture is needed for cost-effective
network management, deployment and operation of the POC devices. Security mecha-
nisms are necessary to address the specific threats associated with POCT system. Se-
curity mechanisms are necessary to address the specific threats associated with POCT
system.The POCT system communication must provide secure storage and secure com-
munication to maintain patient data privacy and security. The Federal Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) reports the leading causes of defects and system failures in medical
devices are caused by gaps between the requirements, implementation and testing.
The research was conducted, and technical research contributions are made to resolve
the issues and challenges related to the POCT system. A communication protocol
implemented at the application level, independent of radio access technologies. A new
methodology was created by combining Easy Approach to Requirement Specifications
(EARS) methodology and Use Case Maps (UCM) model which is a new approach and
it addresses the concerns raised by the FDA. Secure cloud architecture was created
which is a new way of data storage and security algorithms models were designed to
address the security threats in the POCT system. The security algorithms, secure cloud
architecture and the communication protocol coexist together to provide Radio access
technology Independent Secure and Expandable (RISE) POCT system.
These are the contributions to new knowledge that came out of the research. The
research was conducted with a team of experts who are the subject matter experts in
the areas such as microfluidics, bio-medical, mechanical engineering and medicine.
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In the public health and medical communities, there has been a
widely recognized need for monitoring and early diagnosis of in-
fectious diseases in low-resource, low-income developing countries
[6]. Such healthcare delivery strategies contribute to patient man-
agement by decreasing the testing and diagnosing times. In low-
resource, low income environments, diagnostic infrastructures are
not present. The analysis of the diagnosis needs be conducted at a
site close to patients so that the analysis results can be communi-
cated to the patient quickly, in order to manage cures for infectious
diseases. The World Health Organization (WHO) has developed
an operational terminology for quality healthcare delivery called Af-
fordable, Specific, User-friendly, Rapid, Equipment-free, Delivered to
those in need, (ASSURED). ASSURED guides health-care providers
in creating healthcare delivery strategies that provide 85-95 per-
centage analytical performance values in sensitivity and specificity,
which will increase the healthcare management in developing coun-
tries greatly [6, 7]. The monitoring and early detection of biological
1
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entities causing the infectious diseases is vital for effective health-
care management and saving lives. An autonomous and portable
detection system that can process assays and analyze deficient con-
centration samples are needed to comply with the WHOs mandate
for healthcare delivery in developing countries with low resources and
many isolated communities. This critical issuethe need for diagnosis
in such environments to control the spread of inflectious diseases—
is the main driver for developing a health delivery system that is
capable of executing the assays to detect infectious diseases.
Commercially available testing tools for infectious diseases are in-
sufficient to meet the needs of the limited-resource setting or poor
infrastructure-based healthcare deployments. Improved health in
such environments would help the country prosper economically and
socially. In contrast to these developing country scenaria, diseases
such as tuberculosis, malaria, HIV/AIDS and other sexually trans-
mitted diseases are preventable and treatable in the developed world.
Developing countries are still under enormous pressure to provide
healthcare solutions for diagnosing diseases, in spite of technological
advancements available in the developed world. In these environ-
ments, accessibility to laboratory facilities often is not possible for
rural patients, who often lack access to basic testing tools and trained
healthcare personal [8].
Traditionally, rapid tests are often referred to as Point-of-Care (POC),
because they are done by doctors or nurses in the clinic or the bed-
side. POC has been an evolving field of medicine and technology
over the past few years. The most modern form of these diagnostic
tests uses micro- or nanotechnologies which are in effect miniature
laboratories that allow complex biological reactions, which usually
take a long time in a full-sized laboratory, to happen very rapidly.
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The Point-of-Care Testing (POCT) based diagnosis is a method for
bringing medical laboratories to a patients home to conduct diag-
nostic tests (self-tests) so that the patient does not need to go to the
doctor or laboratory in person. WHO envisions POCT as a way of
meeting the complex and critical requirements for delivering health-
care to remote sites where healthcare delivery has challenges. Such
a revolutionary technology helps to provide affordable, accessible so-
lutions. In order to be successful, the system must be available to
local communities to conduct the tests for detection of infectious
diseases. The collected test data then must be transmitted securely
to a secure database for analysis by physicians that will lead to a
diagnosis. An automated response can be set if all the stakeholders
accept a hybrid diagnosis process. The secure test data must reach
clinician/healthcare personnel without delay or inaccuracy. Such
systems can be designed to provide low-cost detection of analytics
even with low concentration samples, and they can run required as-
says faster than laboratory-based testing. These systems lead many
who are concerned about health care in developing countries to hope
that finally there is a way to provide quality, affordable health care
for people in those countries.
The design and development of the POCT system and the associ-
ated security for communication infrastructure must be done with
extreme rigour, as the system is mission critical and safety criti-
cal. Detection of mission anomaly is meant for ensuring the func-
tional safety, an important aspect of the POCT. Diagnosis based on
this testing is an essential process improvement for remote patient
care management. With the security of all communications assured,
physicians gain a tool to diagnose patients who previously could not
afford or could not access reliable health care.
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POCT device-based diagnostics is a medical tool composed of in-
terconnected devices that can provide health care diagnostics in a
patients community environment, external to a hospital-based lab
setting [8, 9]. This testing has many advantages compared to stan-
dard laboratory-based testing [10]. It provides faster diagnosis, re-
duces cost, and introduces automation, which provides the patient
access. It plays a key role in e-health delivery. The advantages
in microbiology and engineering, when linked with the advances in
mobile computing technologies, have enabled the possibility of pa-
tients being diagnosed and treated away from the clinic. There is
an increasing recognition that these m-health (mobile health) and
e-health (electronic processes and communication) technologies will
play a greater role in medical care. The present research will drive
the implementation of digital health care.
The potential benefits of using the POCT device include access to
robust data, a short turnaround time (TAT) for testing, portabil-
ity (ideally handheld), affordability, accelerated clinical decision-
making, and avoidance of the complex pre-processing of biologi-
cal samples. It is less complicated to use than traditional test-
ing, as it is controlled mostly by a wireless smartphone or a one-
touch keypad. Unlike with Lateral Flow Immunoassay (LFIA) tech-
nology, with microfluidics-based molecular diagnostic technologies
used in the POCT-device, required sensitivity and specificity can be
achieved. Sample (or reagent) volume reduction is achieved because
of the reduction in surface-to-volume ratios. Highly reproducible and
quantitative results can be accomplished with the microfluidic-based
system, as well. It is a closed system that can be operated with min-
imal wireless communication infrastructure, depending on the need
[8], and expanded to a multilayer and multiuser system as needed.
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1.1.1 POCT devices in the industry
The scope of the research is not developing a new device for Point of
Care testing. The scope of the research study is to research into com-
munication and data security mechanisms for the POCT systems.
This includes working closely with bio-medical experts, POCT as-
says developers and mechanical engineers in the University research
group and St. Joseph’s hospital medical community who under-
stands patient’s needs.
The following paragraphs provide an overview of the existing POCT
devices. NHS provides buyers guidelines for four kinds of POCT de-
vices: Cholesterol measurement, Urine monitors for Diabetes, Blood
Pressure Monitors and Blood Glucose systems [11]. The following
POCT device manufacturers are discussed in the NHS report. Ab-
bott Diabetes Cares is a medical company that is dedicated to de-
veloping sensor glucose monitoring and testing systems. They are
word number one diabetes care providers [12]. ACON laboratories
provide a wide range of medical solutions for POCT type of de-
vices including Diabetes Care, Clinical Chemistry including urinaly-
sis and Immunoassay Enzyme immunoassay (EIA)/enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay (ELISA) for the International market [13].
Bayer Diabetes Care is a medical service organisation for diabetes
care management. They use devices manufactured by other medical
device other equipment manufacturers (OEMs) [14]. BBI Health-
care provides products and services that are provided to the diag-
nostic, healthcare, research, defence, food and cosmetics industries
globally [15]. Cambridge Sensors Limited designs and manufactures
blood glucose test strips for use in blood glucose monitoring systems
including sensors, microstructures, immunoassays, diagnostic tests,
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and micro-circuits [16]. HemoCue - part of the Radiometer Group,
are being used in more than 130 countries, provides POCT care for
various clinical areas all over the world. They are actively working
on solutions that can be classified as point-of-care testing solutions
in the areas of diabetes management, centrifugation products, oc-
cult blood testing and data management and connectivity solutions
[17]. LifeScan is a diagnostic systems manufacturer with products
focusing on the diabetes market, specifically blood glucose monitor-
ing systems [18]. Medtronic plc is a medical device company, offers
a wide range of medical instrumentation solutions: Cardiac rhythm
disease management, Spinal and biologics, Cardiovascular, Neuro-
modulation (drug delivery system for chronic pain, common move-
ment disorders and urologic and gastrointestinal disorders), and dia-
betes management[19]. Menarini diagnostics provide specific POCT
system for veterinary health care providers and schools [20], [21].
Nova Biomedical is a world leader in the development and manu-
facturing of state-of-the-art, whole blood, point-of-care and critical
care analysers, as well as providing the biotechnology industry with
the most advanced instruments for cell culture monitoring. It gives
blood testing analysers and diagnostic products for healthcare com-
panies. Besides, it provides hospital glucose monitoring systems, hos-
pital glucose/ketone monitoring systems, point-of-care whole blood
creatinine and estimated Glomerular filtration rate (eGFR) test-
ing products [22]. Roche Diagnostics Corporation offers support
for healthcare providers in the prevention, diagnosis, and manage-
ment of various diseases. The company provides assays/reagents,
instruments/systems, laboratory systems and automation products,
QC/calibration products, and biosensors. It gives the point of care
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testing products, such as blood glucose, anticoagulation manage-
ment, blood gas and electrolyte, cholesterol, urinalysis, and infec-
tious disease products; and molecular products, including systems,
donor screening products, and automation products. The company
offers its products for various disease states, such as HPV, HIV,
heart failures, and diabetes, as well as for other medical conditions
[23]. Point Of Care Testing Ltd., distributes point of care diagnostic
instruments and consumables for medical and research markets in
the United Kingdom and Ireland. It offers portable blood and urine
analysis systems for use in human patient-care setting to provide
clinicians with blood constituent measurements [24].
1.1.2 POCT devices developed by DoC Lab at Brunel University
The POCT system research that is being undertaken by the Doc Lab
research group [1]at the Brunel University London has developed
handheld POC device which accepts raw samples from a person and
provides the disease-specific diagnosis. Unlike the standard POCT
device categories listed by the NHS [11], the research goals of the
Doc Lab are to produce automated POC device that is capable of
accepting multiple raw sample inputs (blood, urine, saliva, swabs),
detection of various pathogens within predefined process time (less
than 30 mins) [8]. These devices are typically equipped with the
disposable and closed loop microfluidics cartridges.
The system has a modular architecture which allows the system par-
titioning based on the IEC 62304 standard [25] for medical device
development [26]. Besides, the modular process enables any sec-
tion to be replaced by an alternative method. The communication
Chapter 1 8
methods can be selectable based on the available radio access tech-
nology during deployment [8]. The Doc Lab produced a robust,
low-cost POCT platform for isothermal nucleic acid amplification
on a microfluidic device. The bill of materials is kept inexpensive by
using readily available materials locally and commercial off-the-shelf
components[27]. Because of the use of natural construction meth-
ods, the construction of the device can be operated and deployed
in resource-poor settings, especially in the development world. The
platform uses a nucleic acid amplification test (NAAT) which offers
a potential transformation for clinical and public health medicine.
On the whole, the platform provides low-cost instrumentation for
high-quality diagnostics.
The communication protocol used to trigger the assay process has the
potential of adopting multiple assay types for detecting many infec-
tious diseases in a single POC device. The cloud architecture sup-
ports the HIPPA compliance [28]recommendation. Also, the com-
munication protocol has provisions to assign communication prior-
ities for the assays used in the machine. The sample preparation,
isothermal amplification and detection types can be altered at the
device level. The standard POCT devices in the market are mostly
considered as bench-top devices and require some hands-on sample
preparation[8]. The cost of the benchtop devices is high, within this
paper the development of a prototype, handheld, low-cost amplifica-
tion and detection platform that cost less for the parts.
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1.1.3 POCT device system architecture
The interdisciplinary Electronic System Research Group at Brunel
University has developed a modularized system architecture for op-
erating a POCT device using microfludics technology [29]. The de-
vice uses lab-on-chip technologies for diagnosis of infectious diseases.
A related project called the Electronic Self-Testing Instrument for
Sexually Transmitted Infections (eSTI2) was funded by the Medical
Research Council. eSTI2 consortium is a multidisciplinary, multi-
institutional entity of scientists, clinicians, public health experts, en-
gineers, software specialists and industry specialists who were work-
ing together to develop new types of tests for sexually transmitted
infections and other infectious diseases, that can give accurate re-
sults immediately and also communicate seamlessly with hospital
computing systems through wireless smartphone technology.
Figure 1.1: Schematic diagram of the Brunel POCT architecture [1]
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Figure 1.1 [1] shows the generic device architecture needed for the
POC testing that utilizes lab-on-a-chip technologies. The device
operation is divided into three core functionalities. Sample pre-
treatment (or sample preparation (3)) is the first functionality for
increasing the concentration, where the sample is introduced into
the device with reagents (2). Reduction of surface to volume ratio
enhances aspects of assay kinetics, per test [30]. After the first intro-
duction of the sample into the device, it is be processed which may
involve micro-mixing, heating and separation for extracting DNA
molecules using cell lysis process. The released DNA molecules will
be separated from the rest of the cell debris. The separated DNA
molecule will go through an amplification process (second core func-
tion) to get the required concentration to facilitate the detection of
the DNA molecules.
The next process is the nucleic acid detection (third core function)
using bio-sensing technologies. Achieving sample-in-answer-out in
the device is possible by having the capacity for inclusion of sequen-
tial sample preparation steps, nucleic acid amplification, and DNA
detection in an integrated manner [30]. All three core functionali-
ties, are aided by the microfluidic network. The microfluidic network
operation is managed by the electronic control system (1). The elec-
tronic system enables user interface and display units as well. In
addition these devices are capable of multiplexed analytic detection,
because of the inherent design. Power management is necessary be-
cause the device needs uninterruptable operation during the process.
All the processes are controlled by the smartphone, and the results
are communicated in digital form to outside world. The smartphone
communicates with the device via the communication module (4)
within the device. The test data is tagged with a location attribute
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for data analytics. The collected data is stored in a local storage
unit such as an SD card.
The communication subsystem (4) that is part of the electronic sys-
tem provides connectivity for transferring test data securely to either
an internal private cloud in a hospital / clinic environment or an ex-
ternal public cloud. The locally stored data (5) can be sent to a
central data cloud for actual diagnosis by health care professionals.
The communication system provides short-range wireless radio ac-
cess technologies such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cellular wireless radio
connectivity, and wired USB and LAN links. The cellular network
radio access technologies such as 3G, 4G or 5G can help to establish
connectivity between the device and other external entities such as
the cloud.
The communication links within the device as well as external to the
device are important to ensure the mission critical operations are
carried out without any failure. The external communication links
must be highly secure to preserve patient confidentiality. The test
data collected must not be compromised by any security breaches.
Therefore sophisticated, secure encryption schemes must be deployed
for safeguarding the patient data at all cost. Accessing the device
and initiating the detection tests must be possible only for authorized
users. Unauthorized operations of all kinds must be prevented by the
security mechanisms activated in the system. The test data can only
be accessible via security-enforced communication links, including
data moves within the device or external to the device such as system
log dumps to a server and other types of data storage.
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1.2 Aims and Objectives of Research
The goal of the project is to develop and evaluate communication
pathways, data security mechanisms, and a scalable network for the
system. This communication system will facilitates personalized
medicine and clinical care pathway. This aim is achieved through
the following objectives:
Specific objectives:
• To design a fail-safe communication system architecture suitable
for POCT system deployment.
• To implement the system architecture independent of wireless
technology evolution in communication.
• To develop, test and implement suitable mechanisms to maintain
POCT data security in the communication system protocol.
• To investigate appropriate encryption schemes to identify a suit-
able method for data transfer while maintaining patient confi-
dentiality.
1.3 Summary of Methodology used
A system approach was followed as a methodology for the research.
As shown in Figure 1.2, there are three main data processing lay-
ers present in the system. The Data Collection and Analytics layer
(Cloud Layer) is responsible for providing analytics mechanisms for
a physician to develop diagnostics based on the collected data. The
System Access Layer is responsible for authorizing access to system
users to conduct the test as well as propagating the test data securely
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Figure 1.2: High-level System abstraction view
to the database. The Device Layer is the collection of the devices
capable of carrying out the tests. All the system layers collabo-
rate in providing error-free diagnostic results. A security violation
in any one these layers will lead to a false diagnosis. The Access
Layer represents a system component (or entity) that allows access
to the device via communication links, mostly short-range connec-
tivity such Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or USB. The test data need to be sent
to a data collection layer via cellular (or short range connectivity)
communication links, where the data will be processed further to
analyze the test results .
The research focuses on the communication links and mechanisms
needed to transmit the test data securely from the device via the
Access Layer to the Data Collection Layer. A customized V-model
with agile product development methodology was used to develop
the device and its internal and external communication paths. The
standard V-Model (Figure 1.3 [2]) is a system engineering paradigm
that represents an evolution of the waterfall model [31]. When this
paradigm is internalized by a research organization, it provides a
structured process for understanding research needs and linking them
to requirements, design, and verification and to the final research
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Figure 1.3: Standard V-Model Overview [2]
outcome and future work for the research. It facilitates the continu-
ous integration of the system through the parallel development with
other multi-disciplinary teams. This early collaboration with other
researchers accelerates the research progress by asking critical ques-
tions around whether the right topics are considered before scope of
the research is finalized. When these active feedback loops are estab-
lished between the left and right sides of the V-model, flexibility and
agility of the development teams result in a continuous release pro-
cess where early patient feedback can shape the products delivered
.
Figure 1.3 shows a generic view of the standard system V-model [31].
There are different representations of this model used in the industry,
which reflects how different business groups have tailored the model
to their unique business needs. Starting at the top left, system en-
gineers engage with user experience researchers and marketing and
sales teams to elicit and clarify users and customers needs. These
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needs are translated into system requirements by capturing and ana-
lyzing personas, usages, usage scenarios, and use cases that represent
how users will interact with the system. Same concept is utilized in
the development of the communication architecture for the deploy-
ment of POCT devices for infectious disease diagnostics.
During the requirements definition phase, Use Case Maps (UCM)
methodology (Chapter-3) was used to perform an analysis of the
data to negotiate and resolve conflicting requirements. The com-
munication system architecture requirements establish contractual
baseline between the research scope and the other functional teams
for the architecture to be developed. This baseline is necessary be-
cause research needs will continue to evolve, so the requirements will
also evolve. The baseline is used to provide a context for quantify-
ing the schedule and cost impact of changes that will be imperative
for completing a successful research project. There is a continuous
negotiation throughout the analysis phase as requirements become
better understood. If requirements are found to be in feasible, then
further engagement with the stakeholders may be needed to resolve
the conflict.
As shown in Figure 1.3, an important aspect of the V-model is early
engagement with the quality and test efforts. In general, system
functional test plans can heavily leverage the usage scenarios and
use cases gathered during the requirements definition phase. The
goal of functional testing is to verify that the functional, quality,
and performance requirements have been met. During the system
testing, missing functionality or performance requirements may be
identified, which can be the basis of future research work. Integra-
tion test plans and test cases can be developed in parallel with the
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communication system architecture requirements. The goal of in-
tegration testing is to verify that the components that are able to
coexist and interact with each other as expected. Developing these
plans simultaneously with the architecture provides the researcher
crucial insight into how the architecture will be pieced together as
components become available. Information derived from this activ-
ity influences the architecture and drives consideration of how the
system will be tested. In the research, combinatorial design method-
ology was used to generate test cases for the system validation. The
methodology is explained in detail in Chapter-2 .
Figure 1.4: V-Model developed for research
Figure 1.4 shows customized V-model for the research work that
has been undertaken. The customized model was derived from the
standard V-model. The main differences between the models are
that standard model is used for product development and the cun-
tomized model is created for applying systems approach accomplish-
ing research objectives. The new approach of introducing the UCM
methodology for analysing requirements and combinatorial testing
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are not part of the standard V-model. And the system requirements
are derived from the research scope in the research V-model. Start-
ing at the top left, the researcher conducts a literature survey, and
he or she identifies the research scope. Then follows the creation
of the systems requirements, the architecture development, and the
creation of detailed requirements. The left side of the V-model is
completed with the systems design and implementation. Starting
from the lower right, unit testing and integration testing are done
for the modules developed and configured. The unit level testing
will identify issues with individual modules, such as hardware and
software drivers. As illustrated in Figure 1.3, the integration testing
helps to mitigate any interface related issues and it resolves coexis-
tence issues. Then the process continues in collaboration with other
research team members to create a prototype for functional testing.
The simulation is done for point-to-point network configuration to
decide the communication topologies needed.
The end-2-end system (device internal and external aspects of the
communication) is concerned with functional safety and functional
security, both of which overlay in the system V-model.
Figure 1.5: Functional Safety V-Model Overview
For functional safety, the IEC 62304 standard was adopted to de-
velop the system communication architecture. Figure 1.5 shows the
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functional safety V-model that corresponds to the general system
V-model shown in Figure 1.3 and the research process V-model in
Figure 1.4. More in-depth details of the IEC 62304 applied to the
system design can be found in Chapter-2.
For the security analysis, the V-Model for the security system as
shown in Figure 1.6 was used as a guiding model. Building a secure
communications link for the system has different challenges, and the
issues can be understood by creating thread models and threat mit-
igation strategies. The detailed description of the security analysis
can be found in Chapter-4.
Figure 1.6: Security V-Model Overview
The next section shows an example of the end-2-end communication
architecture developed in the research. Multiple configurations were
generated, and the detailed explanation can be found in Chapter-6
1.3.1 Example of an end-2-end system configuration
The G-Node controls the device, and it acts as an intermediate layer
for external communications. There are many possibilities to connect
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the system entities based on the essential needs. One such configura-
tion is shown in Figure 1.7. More discussion about the configurations
can be found in Chapter-6.
Figure 1.7: End-2-End Connection Topology
As shown in Figure 1.7, the system consists of multiple secure com-
munication links between the network entities. P-Node represents
the device. The communication system is responsible for supporting
the topology connections shown in Figure 1.7. G-Node is a repre-
sentation of the gateway functionality needed for communication of
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multiple devices, while P-Cloud is the representation of cloud func-
tionality required for storing test data and conducting diagnostics
analytics (data storage and analytics cloud). There are five types
of secure communication links that can be configured: G-Node to
the local server, G-Node to P-Cloud, P-Node to P-Cloud, P-Node
to the local server, a device to device communication (Machine to
Machine (M2M) communication), and user to P-Node or user to G-
Node. Some of the links shown in the figure are used for connecting
network entities such as P-Cloud in the public domain, while the
other links are used for establishing connectivity within a private
sphere of connectivity (e.g. within a firewall of a hospital).
The communication system supports multiple cellular radio access
technologies (RAT), 2G, 3G, and LTE. The device architecture was
developed so that when the 5G standard is available commercially
for deployment, it can be added to the device. In addition, location
services module, Bluetooth, USB, Ethernet, and Wi-Fi connectivity
paths are available in the communication sub-system.
There are other communication challenges from the communication
system architecture itself. Modularized sub-systems are needed to
provide decoupled architecture, to manage seamless data flow within
the device. The internal data flow within the architecture will have
an impact on the accuracy of data collection and further impact
in transmitting the data to the P-Cloud. These challenges are ad-
dressed by having a protocol at the application layer of the design.
The P-Cloud has to support many salient features by means of a
secure cloud structure within the cloud to ensure end-to-end con-
nectivity of the communication. It contains of multiple sub-clouds
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architectural components, namely, a measurement data cloud, a nor-
malized data cloud for data mining and analysis, a configuration and
provisioning data cloud, a system deployment data cloud, and a sys-
tem operational data cloud. There are separate data access gateways
to maintain data boundaries and data integrity. Distinct data access
gateways and security groups are required in the P-Cloud to assure
the security boundaries of users of the P-Cloud such as data provi-
sioning agencies, health professionals, field technicians, and patients.
Configurations such as those in the figure help to achieve successful
deployments at the primary care level and are particularly amenable
for use in remote settings with poor or no laboratory infrastructure
[32].
1.4 Thesis structure
Chapter 1: Introduction and scope of research. This chap-
ter introduces and explains the research idea, provides background
information and explains why there is a need for the research. In
addition, it lays out the organization of the thesis.
Chapter 2: Use Case Maps and Requirements for commu-
nication system development. Unambiguous requirements are
key to successful product development. Various tools and methodolo-
gies exist to help with design, development, validation, and project
management. This chapter discusses Use Case Maps (UCM) and
EARS (Easy Approach to Requirements Syntax) methodology for
creating communication system requirements.
Chapter 3: System Design process and Mission Critical
System Design Process for the POCT system. This chapter
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addresses the development cycle of the device. It begins with a
description of the requirement gathering and moves on to outline the
design process. From there, the discussion moves to the end -2-end
system communication topology, the security principles of safety-
critical communication software, and the development of a secure
cloud architecture for the system. Then it addresses the process of
system design compliant with the ICE 62304 standard, the validation
methodologies for testing the communication links, and the Agile
development methodology for project management.
Chapter 4: Security aspects of POCT system development.
Data security is an important feature of the system. This chapter ex-
plains the aspects that need to be protected, given the attack threat
model for the device and the communication links. Use cases related
to security are discussed. Two types of security frameworks have
been developed, challenge and response based framework and sys-
tem behavioral based framework. The discussion addresses security
provisioning in the context of the M2M (e.g. P-Node to G-Node)
communication model in relation to healthcare professional and the
patients who use the system.
Chapter 5: P-Cloud and NAS Implementation. In this chap-
ter, the internal components subsystem of the P-Cloud is explained.
The internal architecture of the P-Cloud, which will provide error-
free data storage for the device is shown in detail. In addition, a
practical implementation of the private P-Cloud using NAS is de-
scribed, along with the results.
Chapter 6: Network Models for POCT system deployment
and simulation results. In this chapter, the various use cases
of connecting the system components are explained. Simulation of
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P2P connectivity representing the communication between P-Node
and G-Node is shown with obtained results. For managing transmis-
sion control, a novel methodology was developed and implemented,
collaborative congestion control, is introduced and explained.
Chapter 7: Conclusion and future work. In this chapter,
achievements and contributions to knowledge are listed, and recom-
mendations for further work are added to continue the research.
The traceability between the chapter contents and the specific goals
are mapped in Table 1.1. The traceability shows the links between
the chapters and the goals of the research in a matrix format for clear
understanding. The row in the table labelled Chapter indicates the
list of chapters in the thesis. The columns in the table labelled Re-
search Scope show the research objectives. The traceability matrix
shows the contents of the chapters relevant to the research objectives.
1.5 Contribution to knowledge
The research involved developing communication configurations for
an end-2-end system architecture that supports device connectiv-
ity. The research also involved creating a design methodology for
a robust, dependable, safe, and secure communication platform for
interconnecting the devices. Unanticipated network infrastructure
changes and latent coding errors lead to operation faults despite that
usually a significant effort has been expended in the design, verifi-
cation, and validation of the software system [32]. It is becoming
increasingly more apparent that one needs to adopt different ap-
proaches that will guarantee that a complex system meets all safety,
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Table 1.1: Mapping between chapters and specific research goals
security, and reliability requirements, in addition to complying with
standards. There are many initiatives taken to develop safety and
security critical systems, at different development phases and in dif-
ferent contexts, ranging from the system infrastructure design to the
device design. Various approaches are implemented to design er-
ror free software for the safety-critical system. The approach and
methodologies adopted in the research can overcome the challenges
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Figure 1.8: Technical contributions (indicated as 1: P-Node architecture, 2: G-Node
to P-Node communication, 3:End-to-End communication and 4:P-Cloud)
in developing error control and communication software for commu-
nication and system architecture (see Figure 1.8).
This present research makes a unique contribution to the health-
care system based on its incorporation of modern and evolving tech-
nologies such as mobile computing and secure and reliable cloud
computing. Figure 1.8 shows the internal system modules needed
for controlling the device from the G-Node (or smartphone). These
subsystem modules can be used in the devices standalone mode of
operation, when the G-Node is not present. As indicated in Figure
1-8, there are four key fields of contribution in this research, as listed
below.
Contribution− 1
System requirement modelling and device architecture, Figure 1.8
([1])
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The research developed the required management approach for the
communication links in order to deploy system securely, including
a representation of requirements using Use Case Maps and EARS
(Easy Approach to Requirement Syntax) methodology. Use Case
Maps are used to express device communication requirements in a
model form which is described in Chapter-3. These requirements
provided the guidance for developing the communication system in
detail. Security-aware architecture for data communication between
the building blocks for the device system was developed. Inter-
nal communication between the sub-systems is vital for ensuring
error-free external communications. The research developed a lay-
ered architecture with multiple functional modules. The model takes
into consideration all the stakeholders (patients, healthcare personal,
clinicians, POCT device manufacturers and network operators) re-
quirements [33].
Contribution− 2
A secure communication protocol independent of radio technology,
Figure 1.8 ([2])
A secure communication protocol with expandability that operates
independent of radio access technology was developed. The radio
technology independent protocol enables data transfer between P-
Node, G-Node, and P-Cloud. The device communication system
was implemented based on the IEC62304 standard, and it specifies
the life cycle requirements for the medical device software and sys-
tem based on the critical safety requirements. The communication
subsystems were portioned to meet the IEC62304 risks classification
classes. Communication between multiple components via connec-




Contribution 3: An End-to-End Secure Communication, Figure 1.8
([3])
Security mechanisms were created and implemented for the end-2-
end communication system consisting of the P-Cloud, the G-Node,
and the POCT device. Two kinds of security concepts (challenge-
response based and behaviour based) have been developed to coun-
teract security threats faced by the device and the communication
system. A smart encryption model for transmitting secure data was
developed. An encryption process of the system data storage and
transmission was designed with encryption key management strat-
egy for private cloud based on NAS [34].
Contribution− 4
Coordinating multiple devices and systems and Secure cloud archi-
tecture for POCT data storage, Figure 1.9 ([4])
The POCT system needs to support multiple devices in a practical
network deployment. A configurable deployment model based on the
capacity and capabilities of the network and the POCT device was
designed and implemented. The system is made up of the hierarchi-
cal model to support large-scale systems with expandability based on
the growth. It is divided into three logical systems: zone, site, and
unit. A zone consists of multiple system sites. A system site contains
multiple instances of POCT device units. Due to data transmission
in three levels, there will be scenarios where the packet drops may
occur, and they must be eliminated due to mission criticality of the
data. Hence a congestion control algorithm for managing the devices
communication has been developed.
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Figure 1.9: Hierarchical model for POCT system management
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Chapter 2
Requirements for POCT system
communication and Architecture
2.1 Introduction
The design and development of the POCT system and the associated
infrastructure must be done with extreme rigour, as it is a mission
critical or safety critical system. The requirements for the creation
and management of the system are the key processes for ensuring
that a highly reliable system with a low defect is developed, since
an accurate diagnosis is an essential process improvement for remote
patient care management. The requirements state what the system
must do and how well, in terms of performance. The requirements
need to be specified accurately, completely, and without any ambi-
guity so that the POCT system can be designed and developed with
minimum implementation defects. This process provides physicians
a vehicle to diagnose patients with increased reliability. Require-
ment modelling can help to express the behaviour of the system in
a visual format. Use of Case Maps (UCM) is one such modelling
technique that sufficiently expresses the model of the required spec-
ifications for the POCT system. The UCM connects the end-2-end
30
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system architecture and its behaviour in a visual format. The re-
sponsibilities of the architectural building blocks (components) and
their interactions can be described effectively. With UCMs, user sce-
narios are drawn as exchanges of messages between the components.
The UCM has notations that were developed at Carlton University,
Canada [35, 36]. It needs informal data about the components of
the system with their roles in the context of the system. It can
express abstract level descriptions and multilevel decomposition of
the functions. and is used to illustrate the functional requirements
and security requirements of the POCT system. Some of the key
requirements are represented with UCM notation The requirements
were created using the EARS (Easy Approach to Requirement Syn-
tax) syntax, which contains known patterns for particular types of
functional requirements and was developed by Rolls-Royce system
engineers [5]. The requirements are captured with a single impera-
tive statement containing shall. The well-written requirements will
provide a higher probability of implementing the system with low
defects and better quality.
All the requirements will have an unique identification number or
format. The identification format of the requirement followed in this
chapter is as follows:
[FR] [sub-system-name] [a-three-digit-numerical-value]
where FR means a functional requirement, sub-system-name is the
name of the associated functional module, and the three-digit is the
unique identification of the functional requirements. Only the high-
level requirements are discussed. Table 2.1 shows the patterns used
in constructing the requirements.
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Table 2.1: EARS pattern [5]
The requirements described here have three main attributes: the
name of the requirement, the description of the requirement, and,
when necessary, the rationale for the requirement. This structure is
followed throughout the chapter.
2.2 POCT System Description
The POCT system is being developed at the Brunel DOC LAB [1]
as described in Chapter-3. It consists of modular subsystems as de-
scribed in reference [32]. The primary building blocks of the system
are considered:
• P-Node the POCT device in the patients home
• G-Node: the gateway device in the patients home
• P-Cloud: the private cloud over which patient data that can
be accessed by physicians is transmitted
These building blocks are shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Basic building blocks
2.3 POCT System Requirements
The P-Node is the representation of the POCT device. The G-Node
represents the gateway entity, which can be a smartphone or a laptop
with internet access. A dedicated hardware device may play the role
of the G-Node. Patient interacts with the P-Node for diagnostic
testing via the G-Node. These devices send measurement data to
the database server, as well as control the P-Node. The P-Cloud
represents the secure private data cloud.
2.3.1 Requirements for P-Node operation
FR-PNODE-001: The P-Node shall have two modes of operation:
user control mode and reporting mode.
The P-Node is initiated by the user interaction, which is called the
user control mode. The measured data needs to be transmitted to
the cloud database, which is called the reporting mode.
FR-PNODE-002: While in the user control mode, the P-Node
shall receive commands from the G-Node for initiating the testing.
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FR-PNODE-003:When completed test results are ready for trans-
mitting to the G-Node, the P-Node shall switch to reporting mode.
FR-PNODE-004: While in reporting mode, the P-Node shall re-
port the test data to the P-Node user (via the G-Node) and to the
P-Cloud.
The requirements FR-PNODE-001,002, and 003 describing the basic
behaviour of the P-Node. There are no other modes of operations
are designed, other than user-control-mode and reporting-mode.
2.3.2 UCM representation of P-Node operation requirements
Figure 2.2 shows the UCM representations of the requirements FR-
PNODE-001, FR-PNODE-002, FR-PNODE-003 and FR-PNODE-
004.
Figure 2.2: UCM representation of P-Node communication links
Path 1 conveys a message to the downstream implementation team
that the P-Node user shall be able to control the P-Node via the
G-Node. Path 1 shows the execution path for this use case (that the
user can control the P-Node ), which is the user control mode of the
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device. Path 2 represents the reporting mode of the P-Node to the
P-Cloud. Path 2 conveys the message to the development team that
the data needs to be sent to the P-Cloud by some communication
means. Note that Path 2 does not go through the G-Node, implying
that the P-Node needs to have a communication subsystem. Path
3 conveys the message that during the reporting mode, the P-Node
also needs to send data to the user via the G-Node. The AND UCM
artefact [37] in Figure 2.2 (the vertical line with three horizontal
lines on one side and one horizontal line on the other side) serves as
a way of enforcing the AND condition that the report needs to be
sent to both the user and P-Cloud. Path 4 conveys the intent of the
requirement to the developer community or the testing community
that the P-Node must send the data also via the G-Node to the P-
Cloud for redundancy. The Paths 1,2,3 and 4 show the execution
pattern that needs to happen with the system as a whole.
2.3.3 Requirements for P-Node construction and system interconnec-
tion
Each requirements will have a unique ID and a brief description
following the EARS methodology.
FR-PNODE-005: The POCT system shall be designed as a col-
lection of functional modules.
A modularized system encourages the design of mission critical sys-
tem such as the POCT as a loosely coupled system [38].
FR-PNODE-006: The POCT subsystems shall interconnect us-
ing industry standard interface technology. The interconnect tech-
nology may include the I2C [39] interface but is not limited to it. A
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standard technology for interconnecting hardware modules helps to
use multivendor modules in the design.
FR-PNODE-07: If there is a fault detected in an isolated systems
module, and then the POCT system shall contain that fault within
the individual module.
FR-PNODE-008: The POCT modularized system shall meet the
mandatory system design and development process as outlined in
the international standard for medical device software and software
cycle processes standard IEC 62304 [38].
FR-PNODE-009: The POCT system shall interconnect with a
third-party system. Note: this interconnection can be via an indus-
try standard interface such as USB or Wi-Fi.
2.3.4 Requirements for P-Node fail safe mechanism
FR-PNODE-010: The POCT system shall be implemented using
multiple, independent hardware modules.
Note: The rationale for this requirement is to have a system that
does not have a single point of failure. A distributed module architec-
ture within the device was developed with minimal inter-dependency.
Any failure in one module will not impact the functionality of the
other modules. The communication radio access technologies are
implemented on single radio modules.
2.3.5 Requirements for POCT system data storage
FR-PNODE-011: When the device completes a diagnostic test
and the communication system is disabled, the device shall store the
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test data in local non-volatile memory.
Note: Local non-volatile memory can include an SD card or a Flash
drive.
FR-PNODE-012: If a communication link failure occurs, then
the device shall identify the source of the failure.
FR-PNODE-013: The POCT system shall include an agent to
monitor communication link failures.
FR-PNODE-014: The P-Node shall encrypt data transmitted to
the P-Cloud using SSL revision 3.0.
FR-PNODE-015: All the data stored in the local storage shall be
moved to the cloud when the communication links are available.
It is not advisable to leave the test data in the device indefinitely
for security and privacy reasons. All the requirements stated (FR-
PNODE-012 to FR-PNODE-015) must be implemented together.
Figure 2.3: Identification of failure points
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The links (Link 1,2,3,4,5 and 6) that are shown in Figure 2.3 are
related to the local data storage when the SD card and Ethernet
connection are used in the POCT system. Typical failure points
are indicated by ground signals as per the UCM notation [40] and
marked in the communication links. It is in addition to the text-
based requirements (FR-PNODE-011 and FR-PNODE-012). The
possible failure points are at the communication link between the
core POCT system and the local SD card link (link 2 failure), the
local SD card and the Ethernet card (link 3 failure), the Ethernet
output link and the router input link (link 1 and link 5 junction fail-
ure) and the router output link to the Internet (link 6 failure). Both
the textual requirements and the UCM representation diagram will
provide an unambiguous way of conveying the intent to the devel-
opment and testing organizations. This modelling paves the way for
applying the failure mode analysis methodologies applicable to med-
ical devices and the associated communication system [41, 41, 42].
2.3.6 G-Node Requirements
As explained previously, the G-Node represents the gateway entity
that has the responsibility for controlling the device and collecting
the test data from the device. The G-Node can be a smartphone
or a computing device such as a PC. The following requirements
(FR-GNODE-XXX) are some of the key features needed to build
the G-Node.
FR-GNODE-001: The G-Node shall be subscribed for the test
completion events for receiving test data from the POCT device.
FR-GNODE-002: The G-Node shall encrypt data transmitted to
the P-Node using SSL (Secure Socket Layer) revision 3.0.
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(Note: a corresponding P-Node requirement has been added under
P-Node requirements: FR-PNODE-014)
FR-GNODE-003: The device shall utilize each of the following
connectivity solutions for communication between the G-Node and
the P-Node:
• Cellular radio (either 2G, 3G, 4G or 5G)
• Wi-Fi
• USB
Figure 2.4: UCM for representing G-Node requirements
Figure 2.4 represents the G-Node requirements (FR-GNODE-001,
FR-GNODE-002) and (FR-GNODE-003) using UCM notation. The
SSL requirement is shown as a static stub (UCM terminology for
special functionality) at both ends. The static stub informs the de-
velopment team that SSL is needed in the G-Node as well as in the
P-Node. The use of the AND junction conveys the intent that Wi-
Fi, USB, and the cellular connectivity are needed as described in the
requirement simultaneously. The OR junction indicates that any one
(or all) of the technologies among the 2G /3G /4G /5G is active at
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the time. The subscription process block shows that the G-Node is
registered with the P-Node for an important event, such as comple-
tion of the assay test. When the test is completed, an indication will
be sent to the G-Node with the measurement data.
The UCM map in Figure 2.4 shows (AND notation) another im-
portant consideration, in that the system design must look at the
coexistence challenges [43] between the 4G and Wi-Fi. The wireless
technologies continually evolve using newer frequency spectrum. Be-
cause of the use of new frequency spectrum, cross interference of two
or many radio access technologies is unavoidable. But in the context
of the POCT system, countermeasures for any interference due to
the coexistence of the radio access technologies must be considered.
2.3.7 P-Cloud Requirements
The data collected from the POCT device is stored in a non-volatile
memory device, such as an SD card, first. This data is transmit-
ted to Cloud storage (P-Cloud) via the G-Node as shown in Figure
2.5. The following section lists the requirements pertaining to the P-
Cloud. The P-Cloud provides a way of sharing the test data among
various health-care organizations. The purpose of the P-Cloud can
be divided into four domains (test data, device provisioning data, op-
erational data and analytic data for data mining. The P-cloud is the
storage for the raw data and the transformed data from the P-Node.
The transformed data is needed for data mining analytics as an aid
to diagnosis. The P-Node to P-Cloud connectivity link is imple-
mented using M2M communication. Physicians use the transformed
data for diagnosis. Therefore, the P-Node needs two separate access
gateways. Provisioning data from POCT devices and deployment
Chapter 2 41
data of the system installations need to use the P-Cloud. The access
path for this usage can be managed by a separate access gateway.
The POCT devices operational data also needs to use the P-Cloud,
and it requires another access gateway to the P-Cloud. Based on the
above concepts, the following requirements are formulated.
FR-PCLOUD-001: The P-Node shall provide secure access based
on SSL 3.0 encryption for storing the POCT device provisioning data
and the POCT system deployment data. Note: The connectivity
between the P-Node and the P-Cloud shall be classified as M2M
communication.
FR-PCLOUD-002: The P-Cloud shall provide secure access based
on SSL 3.0 encryption for storing the POCT devices operational
data.
FR-PCLOUD-003: The P-Node shall provide secure access based
on SSL 3.0 encryption for a physician for diagnosing patient data.
FR-PCLOUD-004: The P-Cloud shall encrypt data transmitted
to the P-Node using SSL revision 3.0.
Figure 2.5 shows the UCM representation of the POCT system in-
dicating all the P-Clod requirements stated. A similar approach is
shown in reference [44]. The responsibilities (or the functionalities)
required within each domain are displayed as X, representing the
capabilities of each of the systems entities. All the capabilities are
not shown. The G-Node has two Xs, indicating the two main func-
tions, to collect data and to connect to the P-Node. The P-Cloud
has two main functionalities, store data, and store diagnosis. The
SSL connectivity shows all the players in the data collection to data
storage process. Starting from the Patient, he or she initiates the
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Figure 2.5: P-Cloud requirements
test via the G-Node (SSL-1). The G-Node responds to the patient
and connects with the P-Node (SSL-2), triggering the corresponding
assay on the device. When the data is ready, it is collected back to
the G-Node (SSL-3). The collected data then is transmitted back to
the P-Cloud (SSL-4) and it is securely stored. The transmitted data
is available for a physician for analysis and data analytics (SLL-5,
SSL-6). The diagnosis results is available for the patient (SSL-7).
The SSL-7 links a web URL to view the results.
The communication path from the patient and ends at the P-Node
(also UCM path ending). The other communication path starts from
the P-Node, goes through the G-Node, P-Cloud, and physician, and
ends with the patient. There is another communication path that
starts from the patient and ends at the G-Node, which represents the
secure communication access. Note that creating the UCM paths
to describe the dynamic behaviour of the system is entirely up to
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the system architect or designer. The success of the system design
depends on the way in which the architecture is created.
2.3.8 POCT System Security Requirements
FR-POCT-DATA-001: Data stored on SD card shall be pro-
tected for authorized read and write activity. The following section
Figure 2.6: MUCM Example
discusses security requirements, using the technique called MUCM
(missed use case maps) [45]. Security with respect to the data is
elaborated.
Figure 2.6 shows the UCM and the MUCM paths for accessing data
from and to the SD card. Since the initial data storage is on the SD
card, it must be protected. The P1 path is a normal operation for
writing data to the SD card during the test. Path P2 shows the read-
ing of data from the SD card. These are the UCM representations
for R/W data from/to with respect to the SD card.
The path P3 shows an intruder attempting to modify or read data
on the SD card illegally, by connecting to the POCT System from an
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unauthorized smartphone. The path P4 indicates that the misuser
(unauthorized user ) searches the SD card for the data. P5 indicates
the misusers attempts to read the data. Attempting to access the
data fails because of the closed-loop nature of the system and the
security measures that are in place (Security measures are addressed
in Chapter 4).
2.4 P-Node Architecture Overview
Figure 2.7: Modularize framework
The architecture of the P-Node is organized into 12 modules as shown
in Figure 2.7. The P-Node system architecture will have the follow-
ing SW and HW modules, forming a generic framework independent
of interconnecting (hand-held or smartphones) devices. In this sec-
tion, the framework is named the P-Node system framework. The
interconnecting devices will use a communication protocol to send
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data and retrieve information from the P-Node system framework.
The communication protocol details are shown in the diagram Fig-
ure 2.8. All the modules that are described here will provide services
that will be consumed by other modules to accomplish mission crit-
ical safety requirements for implementing the P-Node terminals. In
other words, the proposed frame is a service-oriented system frame-
work architecture for implementing P-Node systems, based on sim-
ple, functional calls or messaging. Because of the modularized ar-
chitecture, the POCT system can be built using in-house developed
modules and external libraries as a hybrid system.
2.4.1 M1: CMD module
Figure 2.8: CMD Module in detail
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The M1 module is responsible for interpreting commands that are
sent from the five types of interfaces that are shown in Figure 2.8.
The CMD module will incorporate security mechanisms that can
be made to comply with the medical security directive specified by
privacy and data protection agencies. The command modules role
is to interpret the command data received via the user interface
or other communication interfaces (wireless and USB based). The
proposed command module has five layers. Each layer has a distinct
responsibility in validating a command received by the five types
of interfaces. These interfaces are: USB, Ethernet LAN, Wireless
(cellular and connectivity), GUI and Medical Interface [46].
2.4.2 Interface types:
There are five types of interfaces considered. USB is the well-known
connectivity mechanism for any IoT device. The Ethernet LAN con-
nectivity is shown as connectivity for accessing data from a private
cloud. The diagram in Figure 2.8 shows two ways of interfacing with
the P-Node, via the private cloud and direct connection to a PC. It is
also possible to have the same connectivity via the wireless interface
as depicted in the Figure.
2.4.2.1 CMD layer 1: Interface Module:
The interface module provides driver support for all the predeter-
mined interface paths for the five primary input interfaces shown in
Figure 2.8. In practice, this is provided by stacked HW modules
[47] such as the stackable Arduino HW, or integrated multi-input
systems such as Intel Galileo [48]. An interface module based on
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the Arduino system has been demonstrated, and the configuration
details have been published [32].
2.4.2.2 CMD layer 2-3: CMD interpreter and Interface Policy
When the command is decoded and parsed, the contents are passed
on to the interface policy layer. The interface policy layer looks at
the interface type attribute and decides if this command is allowed
or denied based on the policy rules configured.
2.4.2.3 CMD layer 4: Security validator
The role of security validator is to make sure that data integrity is
preserved in accordance with the data encryption scheme.
2.4.3 M2: CNTL module:
The M2 module is responsible for providing control functionality
for thermal control, magnetic control, and other implementations
(realizations) of required control algorithms.
2.4.4 M3: Communication module:
The M3 module is responsible for all the communication (native
and non-native) related to functionality. The native communication
stacks such as TCP / IP, USB, and Ethernet are provided by this
module. This module will provide features for GUI and medical in-
terface connectivity. This module is responsible for location services
as well. Self-contained MODEM solutions provided by Intel [49] or
Qualcomm [50] are the examples of the M3.
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2.4.5 M4: OMAP module:
The OMAP (Operations, Maintenance, and Provisioning) module is
responsible for device operation, handling SW / HW maintenance,
administrative functionalities (e.g. billing) such as interacting with
health care providers (organizations), and provisioning (i.e. the con-
figuration of device services).
2.4.6 M5: Error handling module:
The M5 module manages all type of errors and exceptions during
operation and configuration of the device. The M5 module handles
the communication errors in M3. The generation of error codes and
responses to errors are covered by this module.
2.4.7 M6: Local DB handler:
The local DB handler module is responsible for providing local data
storage services. One of the usages of this module is to handle the
data storage securely during loss of communication link between the
G-Node device and the P-Node device. This module uses the services
provided by the security module for securing the data storage on the
system SD card.
2.4.8 M7: External DB connectivity module:
Module M7 is responsible for establishing connectivity between ex-
ternal DB systems that are located in a private cloud, secure server
farms, or data warehouses. The M7 module uses the services pro-
vided by the communication module and other modules. In addition,
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it creates secure communication links to the external DB repository
as needed.
2.4.9 M8: Reporting module:
The module M8 provides services that are required to produce re-
ports and charts via the GUI interface on the device itself. This
module may participate in concert with handheld or smartphone
devices in the creation of required reports via the communication
protocol.
2.4.10 M9: Security module:
The M9 module provides mechanisms (as functions for other modules
to use) for protecting user data and user accounts associated with the
devices. It provides access services for privileged access users. This
module is responsible for managing security policies, as well. The
security policies supports the required access to the device interface.
2.4.11 M10: Device health monitoring module:
The M10 module acts as the watchdog of functionality for the whole
device. If the M10 determines that device behaviour is unexpected
(i.e. not known behaviour) or a faulty situation, then the M10 at-
tempts to take predetermined actions.
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2.4.12 M11: Power Management module:
The M11 module provides power managing control for battery power
saving. The module used in the POCT communication systems has
it own power management capabilities.
2.4.13 M12: Product Evolution module:
The role of the M12 module is to provide compatibility information
and a development path for expansion of the product. The module
is usually accessible by the development community (such as Intel-
based products [51]) who will help to develop applications and other
related new developments for the P-Node. The new trends and user
needs are captured and implemented as content in this module.
2.5 Protocol for POCT system communication Open Com-
munication Protocol
An application specific communication protocol (Figure 2.9) is de-
veloped to run at the higher layer of the software stack. It is named
a Open Communication Protocol because it is an open framework
system, and it can be used without encryption, thereby enabling the
communication design to exist independent of the communication
and radio access technologies used. This is deliberate, to manage
the continuing changes in the wireless access technology. In prac-
tice, the device can work with any communication system as a plug
and play process where the core of the POCT communication does
not impact due to the change in lower layer communication tech-
nologies. The protocol structure is a framework for implementing its
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Figure 2.9: Communication protocol
commands in the POCT applications. The protocol is expandable
and scalable as needed for processing the assays and it is independent
of the type of POC testing application.
There are seven protocol data segments needed establish communica-
tion links between G-Node and P-Node is shown in Figure 2.9. Each
protocol segment is organized as a byte (8 bits) or word (16 bits)
format. The key to the usage of the protocol is the operation code
(OPCODE). The OPCODE captures the behaviour or the sequence
operation needed to execute an assay. Since this is a framework for
using the protocol, the OPCODE is user a defined entity.
Chapter 2 52
2.5.1 PKT (Packet) type
The packet type has five significant bits that indicate the type of
command that the P-Node can understand. They are named: REQ
(Request Bit), EVENT (Event Bit), CFM (Conformation Bit), IND
(Indication Bit), and SEC (Security Bit). The REQ bit indicates
that the P-Node receives a request to initiate an assay. It is up to
the application developer to map the request to the assay test that
pertains to the P-Node. The mapping function can be hardcoded, or
it can be user configurable based on predefined process mapping. In
other words, the REQ triggers a set of functions which are needed to
run a particular assay. If the P-Node is capable of testing multiple
infectious types, then the OPCODE can be defined to map relevant
functionalities.
The EVENT bit indicates (and provides guidance) on what kind of
event needs to be communicated. The event type is defined in the
Operation Code data segment. The examples for the event type
operation codes (VALIDATE-USER-DEVICE, AUTHENTICATE-
USER) are shown in the table contained in Figure 2.9. One of the
use cases is that the event occurs within the P-Node and the event
information is needed to display a message on the G-Node. The
OPCODE can be added for the other use cases pertaining to another
type of test. Only the registered events will be reported to the G-
Node. One of the bits in the OPCODE can be assigned to record
the G-Node registration. There are no hard and fast rules regarding
which bits will be used for capturing the functionalities.
The CFM bit indicates an acknowledgement (ACK) to the sender
of the command. The sender will use the confirmation bit to im-
plement further response or process the data in its domain, based
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on the requirement. The IND bit segment is used to inform any
connected devices about the status of the testing. It is up to the
biologist to design the mapping information as shown in the ta-
ble (e.g. DNA-DECTED, DNA-AMPLIFICATION-STARTED, and
DNA-AMPLIFICATION-COMPLETED). In a practical system, the
biologist will create the mapping table and hand it down to the ap-
plication developer to code it.
The SEC bit can be adapted for many uses. One of the usages of
the SEC bit is that it can indicate the type of encryption used and
an OPCODE will be created for the type of encryption used. The
combination of the security and the operation code (SEC-BIT, OP-
CODE) will inform the communication parties about the encryption
scheme (standard and proprietary) in use so that at each end the
decryption can be done as per the encryption scheme used. Note
that if the security bit is not set then, there is no encryption is
implemented. .
2.5.2 Interface type
The interface type supports five categories (mapped to individual
bits) of information that needs to be communicated to the entities.
The role of the interface type is to define user access to the P-Node.
The medical interface is a particular interface type, and it informs
the P-Node that the command sender supports the IEEE 11073 BT
stack[52]. The sender device entity has certification of IEEE 11073,
and it has an easy way to interface with sensor devices. The GUI in-
terface type bit indicates that the command data is sent from the P-
Node Graphical User Interface (if P-Node has built-in display unit).
It informs the P-Node that the user dozent have access to a G-Node
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at the time the command is sent from the GUI. Further, the test
data must be kept within the device until it is sent to the P-Cloud.
2.5.3 Operation Code
The operation code defines the operations that are possible with the
P-Node. The OPCODEs are user-defined as required for the device.
The OPCODE can be set to 8 or 16 bits in length. The flexibility
of having user-defined OPCODEs helps to customize the P-Node for
a particular type of testing. An 8-bit OPCODE length will result
in 256 types of operations for the device. A 16-bit OPCODE length
will produce 655356 operation codes, which may be not be needed
unless complex functionality is implemented. The OPCODE-based
system is flexible, so that any future functionalities can be enabled
with minimal changes to the implementation.
2.5.4 Type of Service (TOS)
The type of service field is an optional field that can be set depending
on the application. For example, the TOS codes in the context of the
testing can be defined by the P-Node device manufacturer and the
associated ecosystems. The ecosystem for the testing would consist
of many players, namely, P-Node vendors, POCT service providing
communication carriers, POCT application developers (both for the
device based UI and the applications written for the G-Node), and
healthcare providers. Thus the TOS code provides bridges between
the ecosystem (support system for providing wireless services) play-
ers for the system deployment. One of the uses of the TOS code is
for billing among the ecosystems entities.
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2.5.5 Security Information
The purpose of security information is to provide information regard-
ing the security encryption method used in the device. If the security
info field is set to 0x00, this means that the data is not encrypted.
Note that it is possible to transmit data safely without any encryp-
tion because of the closed nature of the system. One should know
the format of the data stream to understand the measured data from
the POCT device. The SEC bit can be combined with the security
info segment.
Whenever data is sent between the G-Node and P-Node, there is a
preamble data segment (field) sent first. The detail of the preamble
fields is shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Preample and End Data Segments
The same concept is explained in Figure 2.11. The first step is
to start the transmission and decide the preamble-data-segment
(pd-segment) and the transmission end-data-segment (ed-segment)
for communication. In the context of the POCT device, POCT and
POCTRES are chosen as the preamble data segment and the end
data segment. The POCT is an acronym for Point of Care Test, and
the POCTRES is an abbreviation for Point of Care Test Response.
These are user-defined values, and they can be constructed as 8 or
16 bits (or user-defined data length), as needed by the ecosystem
entities. Unless the values of the preamble data segment or the end
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data segment are known, it is difficult for an intruding entity to
sync-up with a transmission between the P-Node and the G-Node
for the purpose of stealing the actual measurement data. This can be
named as open communication without the need for any encryption
schemes.
The values of the pd-segment and the ed-segment fields can be
changed periodically for enhancing data security. The frequency of
the period of change can be shared using the security info field. The
algorithm shown below explains the management process of commu-
nication between the G-Node and the P-Node, while the values of
the pd-segment and the ed-segment are changing periodically. Note
that the algorithm segment needs to be implemented in only in the
P-Node code. The key to the communication mechanism is that
G-Node is the master that informs the P-Node of what needs to be
done. Three type of encrypted communication processes are possible:
standard security algorithms based encryption and proprietary en-
cryption algorithms (explained in Chapter 4), open communication
as explained in the Figure 2.10 and a hybrid of the two methods.
The high-level algorithm is shown in Figure 2.10. It starts with
sending a POCT command to the P-Node (line: 2). The security-
info is decoded and, if it is set for open communication, records the
communication method in a status flag (line: 4-5). The communi-
cation reception starts with the preamble DOC (user defined) and
ends with DOCRES (user defined). The reception of the DOC is
noted as is the number of bytes expected by the receiving node to
be determined (line: 6-10). This process will continue until the ed-
segment (DOCRES) is received (line: 11-19). An error condition
will be declared if all the test data is not received. The error will be
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Figure 2.10: Core pseudocode for data TX and RX
logged, and also all the nodes in the communication path for pro-
viding a response to the user (line: 20-24) will be informed. The
receiving node reassembles the data using order index value which is
a variable part of the test data bytes. The test data bytes have the
index value and the raw data. By the end of these processes, there
will be new values for the pd-segment and ed-segment, pertaining to
the next set of test data. The new values will be used until a new
value is received in the security info field. Note the security info field
is used for multiple purposes. Since this is a framework communi-
cation protocol, an application developer can use the field for any
other user-defined propose.
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2.5.6 Data Length, Protocol Version, Data bits (bytes)
The data length indicates the number of data segments (measure-
ments points) involved in the testing. Note the number of data
segments is not limited. The only limitation is the size of the user
memory (storage size) in the POCT device. The protocol version is
used to maintain interoperability within the ecosystem. The appli-
cation developers must use the same version of the protocol for the
communication. The data bit (or bytes) is the measurement point
of the outcome of a particular assay. Usually, these are (time, data)
pairs. The time (measurement intervals) are user-defined, and they
can be set from the G-Node or predefined at the P-Node level. The
OPCODE can be used to trigger the required measurement intervals,
as needed.
Table 2.3: Protocol Command mapping to OPCODES
2.5.7 MSC for CMD communication
As shown in Figure 2.11, the message sequence chat describes inter-
action (after compatibility test). The compatibility test determines
the protocol versions installed on both sides, i.e. the P-Node and
the G-Node. If the compatibility test fails, the user will be informed
using an appropriate error message, and the process of upgrading
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the protocol versions is initiated. Once the compatibility issues are
resolved, the user will be in a position to initiate the test needed. In
Figure 2.11: Data communication Message Sequence Chart
Figure 2.11, the command is sent to the device using the protocol
table. This command represents a request (REQ) sent to the de-
vice, asking to start the assay process (by decoding the OPCODE).
The request could have been initiated pressing a simple UI inter-
face on the P-Node, as well. Once the measurement process starts,
the device knows steps to carry out the requested assay. The de-
vice also sends back a confirmation flag (ACK /CFM) to the sender
(G-Node). After the measurement process is completed, the device
sends the data with indication flag (IND: M-Bit) with measurement
bit enabled, along with the application ID (APP-ID). The APP-ID
helps to track the requests between G-Node and the P-Node.
The G-Node sends back the acknowledgement (ACK) to the P-Node.
The data is then transmitted periodically to the G-Node until the
P-Node receives the ACK byte flag from the G-Node.
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The user or the application developer can create a protocol table
that is required for the test application. With this protocol frame-
work, the application developers can build their implementation by
creating additional entries in the table.
2.5.8 PROTOCOL EXPANSION STRATEGY
Figure 2.12: Protocol evolution
The protocol needs to be modified as new requirements are devel-
oped. The attributes shown in Figure 2.12 are proposed to manage
the new changes such as the addition of new OPCODES for new
types of assays that may be added in the future.
The G-Node and the P-Node must have a compatible protocol imple-
mentation. Before any testing is initiated, the compatibility of the
two systems must be validated, as the testing process is a mission
critical operation. The attribute Main revision number is to indi-
cate that the SW in both G-Node and P-Node are compatible. The
security is the essential functionality, and it must be kept in sync
with any encryption key changes that may be needed due to evolv-
ing security threats. A change in security algorithms or encryption
usually is sent to the POCT application installed on G-Node, assum-
ing that the wide area connectivity (WAN) is provided by G-Node.
It is also possible that the P-Node can receive the security alerts
(via WAN), depending on the deployment scenarios (Chapter 6). In
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any case, the attribute Security algorithm version change indicator
reflects the security validation process.
New functional enhancements will be indicated by the attribute New
change to the protocol. The other use of the attribute is to indicate
any changes to the protocol structure. The variations in the OP-
CODEs will be captured by the last attribute, How many OPCODEs
have been added.
Before any testing related communication begins, the four attributes
stated here can be used to verify if the G-Node and P-Node are com-
patible regarding SW. The user will be alerted by any mismatches.
The tests will be allowed only if the attributes are compatible. The
compatible mapping is left to the application developer to config-
ure. Note that any human errors or configuration errors will result
in data error, and the test data from such a system cannot provide
valid data for diagnosis.
2.6 Experimentation with Android-based smartphone and
Bluetooth
Figure 2.13: System setup
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The system set-up for development is shown in Figure 2.13. The
main components are the Arduino board and the Bluetooth board
[47]. The actual modules used in the experiment with the Bluetooth
module are shown Figure 2.14.
Figure 2.14: Arduino Uno and BT module
A PC based tool was developed based on QT (Nokias UI development
platform) [53] technology (Figure 2.15). The QT IDE (Integrated
Development Environment) represents the G-Node. The detail view
of the IDE shows transmission and receive windows for testing the
protocol (Figure 2.15). The QT-based tool is a development platform
for modifying the protocol for future needs.
The Figure 2.15 shows an Integrated Development Environment (IDE)
that was developed for experimenting with the protocol implemen-
tation. The IDE is based on the QT framework, an open source
environment. It can be used for testing the POCT device compo-
nents or peripherals such as motor (LABEL-A). LABEL-B indicates
the transmission data window and LABEL-C indicates the receive
data window. LABEL-D is the motor control instrumentation (speed
set) for the POCT device. LABEL-E the controls for reading the
communication ports and status indicators. LABEL-F is the mobile
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Figure 2.15: TX Window and RX window for protocol development - QT based IDE
(Protocol Development Utility Tool)
device view for the application developers use. The purpose of the
utility tools is to assist developers in creating POCT applications
and testing changes to the communication protocol.
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Figure 2.16 illustrates the reception of data from the P-Node. An
Android-based smartphone was used as the G-Node. The BlueTerm
application was used to receive the serial data via BT. Figure 2.16
indicates the data header POCTRES, the measurement bit, and the
actual measured data. The application developer can use this data
to create a smartphone application for the POCT. The POCTRES
header shows the data header of the received data set from the POCT
device. The Measured data availability is the bit indicating that
availability of the test data. This can be used to trigger other ap-
plication specific user interface controls on the smart-phone (which
is G-Node). The Measurement data indicates a sample test data
measurement sent from the POCT device.
Figure 2.16: Protocol communication Data reception from POCT device)
2.7 Summary
The requirement defects are often the least expensive items to fix
at the early stages of a project. The validated requirements form
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the basis of many other work products in the project. Correcting
defects earlier in the products development is more cost effective than
attempting to correct them during the testing phase. The modelling
techniques such as UCM and MUCM, facilitate the clear explanation
of requirements and their textual descriptions. This chapter shows
a novel way of using the Use Case Maps in requirements creation,
while the MUCM is used to explain security requirements.
Based on the visual representation of the UCM, its adoption to ex-
press complex requirements will help to communicate requirements
in addition to their text description. It helps to manage the project
at all stages of product development: requirement elicitation, anal-
ysis and validation, product specification creation, verification, and
management. An ambiguous requirement can be expressed in terms
of the UCM visual representation. It is safe to state that if a require-
ment is difficult to express in the UCM, then the implementation of
the requirement will be difficult for the downstream development
teams.
The UCM will help to narrow gaps between the design and require-
ments because of the visual representation. Using UCM to express
requirements will provide a clear traceability between test cases and
the requirements. Hence, the miscommunication between the testing
and design teams can be minimized. A new development project can
be managed with low risk because the ambiguity in requirements is
less with the use of UCM. A way of measuring the success of using
the UCM for expressing the requirements can be done by gathering
defect containment rates and defect finding rates.
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P-Node architecture as explained in this chapter outlines twelve fun-
damental system functionalities for realizing a POCT device, includ-
ing wireless communication interfaces. In a practical system design,
the P-Node will have shared responsibilities between the commu-
nication processor (MODEM) and the application processor. The
architecture described can be implemented in any Open Source hard-
ware platform. Arduino is used for the research work, while Round-
Robin software architecture is used for the experimentation. The
Round-Robin looping is adequate for supporting the functionalities
in the P-Node. P-Nodes are typical embedded systems with wireless
connectivity. They usually have some kind of embedded operating
systems such as Linux, which is capable of providing task-oriented
software architecture. If an operating system is used, then it needs
to be certified by the FDA.
The protocol developed for communication stays at the application
level of the system software stack. It works with all types of RAT
(radio access technologies): 2G, 3G, 4G, and 5G. It is independent
of the radio layer, which makes it portable to all the current and fu-
ture RATs. The protocol uses an OPCODE, which is a user-defined
variable. The OPCODE is mapped to various events in the P-Node,
and it can adopt all the events related to steps in the assays (user-
defined). It supports multiple interfaces: USB, Ethernet, Wireless,
User interface, and Medical interface. It is a protocol framework
which can be modified by the application developer. Thus the pro-
tocol is scalable and expandable based on the need.
In this chapter, all the end-to-end aspects of systems development are
reviewed. The key to successful product development is to have re-
quirements that are understood across the all the functional teams.
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The UCM methodology is an effective modelling process that ex-
presses the system requirements in a visual format. The RAT in-
dependent protocol gives a stable and mature framework for system






In the medical devices industry, system failures can cost lives and re-
sult in fatal consequences. The faults can arise due to the interaction
between the software, the hardware, and the operating environment.
Unexpected environmental changes lead to software abnormalities
that may have a significant impact on the overall success of the sys-
tem operation. Latent coding errors can surface at any time during
the system operation and trigger faults despite significant effort hav-
ing been expended in verification and validation (V and V) of the
software system. Extra efforts and spending considerable time in the
V and V is not enough to guarantee that a complex software system
meets all safety, security, and reliability requirements [54]. Medi-
cal devices are particularly partial to interoperability issues due to
incompatible data formats that lead to fatal consequences in the
interconnected network environment [55].
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Point of Care Testing (POCT) is becoming an increasingly popular
method compared to standard laboratory testing for the diagnosis of
infectious and genetic diseases. This testing methodology has shown
many advantages such as diagnosis time reduction, cost reduction,
portability and better process control due to the automated nature of
the POCT device in a hand-held or bench-top for-mats. This reduces
the risk of human error. The decrease in diagnosis time and rapid
onset of treat-ment has been shown to improve patient outcome in
emergency settings [56]. In certain instances, diagnostic errors such
as false positive results can occur, which could lead to unnecessary
treatment or a delay in therapy [57]. Therefore, it is vital that a
good quality assurance process is needed for the POCT.
The POCT devices use the automated process control for measur-
ing parameters pertaining to medical diagnosis (assays administered
in laboratories). It is deployed in a network connected envi-ronment
and it meets the basic definition of the Safety Critical System (SCS).
In this context, this chapter shows how inherent complexity of soft-
ware development process cycle for implementing the system can be
project managed, designed and verified, using the methodologies,
tools and system design concepts that are followed in prototyping
the device and its communication system. These software systems
developing processes will help in eliminating (or minimizing) fatal
consequences of errors made in software coding. In other words, a
holistic strategy of developing soft-ware (SW) is needed.
The chapter contents have been divided into different sections. Each
section addresses the communication design development process
with various aspects of the development cycle to pro-duce the end-
2-end system. In section 3.2, a requirement eliciting methodology
called Value-Based Requirements Gathering (Pyramid Requirement
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Eliciting Processes) is described. This process eliminates ambiguity
in requirements. This is essential for developing any safety critical
system. In section 3.3, a system design process and technique that
is used in the development of the system end-to-end architecture is
described. The system identification process will provide a basic ab-
straction view of the system that needs to be designed and to be im-
plemented. In section 3.4, the role of security design in the develop-
ment of the system is explained. In section 3.5, operational scenarios
used have been discussed. In section 3.6, a cloud-based architectural
strategy for the de-vices has been presented. In section 3.7, justifi-
cation and benefits for adopting recommendations from IEC 62304
at the early stage of the development cycle are given. In section
3.8, a process generating testing strategy based on combinatorial de-
sign methodology has been described. This methodology shows how
less number of test scenarios guarantees 99 percentage functional
coverage as op-posed to spending time and resources on exhaustive
testing. In section 3.9, a recommendation for project management
methodology that will potentially help to eliminate software errors
is discussed. Finally, in section 3.10, a summary is presented.
3.2 Pyramid Requirement of Eliciting Process
3.2.1 Issues with current process
The FDA has analysed 3140 medical device recalls between 1992 and
1998. These reveal that 242 of them (7.7 percentage) are traceable
to software failures related to device and associated communication
links. Those software related recalls, 192 (or 79 percentage) were
linked to software defects that were introduced when changes were
made to the software after its initial distribution [58]. One of the
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reasons for the failures was that the requirements were not fully
understood by the down-stream development teams when changes
were made.
Figure 3.1, shows the traceability relationship between requirements
and the downstream teams: design, software coding, testing and
deployment teams. The Figure also shows those portions of the
system with errors increase as the development cycle moves from
the requirement phase to the implementation phase. Note that the
errors portion at the design and SW coding level is greater than the
errors portion at the requirement level. Less error at the requirement
level will have a cascade effect at the last stage. It is very clear
that by controlling and eliminating the errors at the requirement
phase can be minimized at the implementation level. At any given
phase of development, the domain experts concentrate on their main
deliverables and have limited awareness of information from previous
phases.
Figure 3.1: Sources of errors and phases in development cycle [3].
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3.2.2 Pyramid Requirement Model
In order to eliminate the errors that originate from the requirement
phase, a methodology is presented here. It is known as Problem
Pyramid modelling and is amalgamated prior to creating any re-
quirements. The requirements become unclear because they are not
tied to key measures. The pyramid modelling provides a way to asso-
ciate the key measures that the requirement needs to fulfil as shown
in Figure 3.2. Each block is identified with a flow, which will help
to create a meaningful and error-free requirement. The requirement
can be refined methodically by having the iterative refinement pro-
cess (via stages 1 to 2 to 3 to 4 to 5) until all the stakeholders are
satisfied.
Figure 3.2: Problem-Pyramid [3]
At stage (1) the problem is defined. At stage (2) a measurement
value that confirms the existence of the problem is stated. At stage
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(3) the goal is defined in quantifiable terms to indicate the desired
measured value. At stage (4) causation analysis to understand the
problem domain is done. As shown in the Figure stages (2) and (4)
are at the same level. Also stage (4) reveals the rationale needed
in creating the requirement. At stage (5) the requirement is formu-
lated. At stage (6) the implementation options are stated. It is very
unlikely that a System Engineer who focuses on the Pro-gram and
Test phase (Figure 3.1) will detect an error propagating from the
Requirement phase (Figure 3.1). However, the use of the Pyramid
Model would prevent error propagation and help create error-free re-
quirements. In other words this methodology gives more importance
to technical and business values that the requirement brings to the
device development [3].
An example of formulating an error-free requirement for the device
communication operation is shown in Table 3.1.
(1) Problem:
POCT Device user needs to input appropriate
communication parameters when configuring the device
(2) Current Measure:
Allows to enter only cellular RAT selection
and unable to select WiFI or BT
(3) Goal Measures:
Must be able to select both the cellular as well
as other networks
(4) Causes: Keypad entry does not differentiates entry
(5) Should be:
Keypad should differentiate the entry for any
of the identified communication links
(6) Design: Add universal select function to the keypad
Table 3.1: Application of Pyramid Process
In this example, items (1) and (2) represent the problem domain;
item (3) states the desired outcome; item (4) identifies the problem
causes; item (5) states the requirement to accomplish the desired
goal; item (6) states the design view of how the requirement can
be implemented. With this kind of information it is very hard to
make software related coding errors because the requirement is tied
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to a measurable goal. This process increases visibility and access to
actual requirements for the downstream team (software development
and verification teams). This will encourage all the teams who are
in the various vertical layers to collaborate effectively to produce
error-free software for the medical devices.
3.3 System Design Process and Techniques
3.3.1 Basic Building Blocks Identification
Analysis of medical devices recalls reports, in the FDA database from
2005-2006 shows 109 software related recall cases. The main recall
reason for the high-risk device is that the device contains many sys-
tem design defects. Though the ratio of Class I devices with high
risk was declining in 2006 compared to 2005 [59], the FDA data still
shows the repeatable occurrence of device recalls. Directives and
legislation have been proposed for software vendors for preventing
product failure [60]. The design defects are the results of failure to
understand the intent of the requirements by the design team and
the lack of architectural view of the end-to-end system. Formulat-
ing the basic building blocks of the system that is being developed
will help to design a fundamental DNA of the system architecture.
Once the basic building blocks are understood, they can be orga-
nized or connected in such a way that a service (functionality) can
be implemented to meet user requirements.
The basic building block view of the POCT end-2-end communi-
cation system consists of P-node, G-node, local server and P-cloud
(Figure 3.3). The P-Node is the representation of the POCT device.
The G-Node is the representation of the gateway entity, which can
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Figure 3.3: Basic building blocks of POCT System
be a smartphone or a laptop which is used to send measurement
data to the database server. The P-Cloud is the representation of
the secure private data cloud which has special interface access re-
quirements such as UKs NHS digital [61] cloud infrastructure, USA
Cloud Standard Customer Council [62] and Canadian Info way [63].
The P-Node user is the patient who is authorized to run tests using
the G-Node.
In general, there are two main root classes of the mode of operation of
the system. When a request for testing is initiated from the G-Node
to P-Node, the mode of operation is defined as user functional mode.
When the data is sent from the P-Node to the P-Cloud after the test,
the mode of operation is defined as reporting mode. In other words,
in the User Functional (Control) mode the request from G-Node and
response from P-Node are communicated to the P-Node user (patient
/ health-care worker / clinician). In the Reporting mode, data is sent
back from P-Node to G-node. These are two main abstracts of the
high-level communication scenarios for the system.
Chapter 3 76
3.3.2 Isolating System Module Responsibilities
Once the basic building blocks have been identified, isolation of
the functionalities and creation of functionality boundaries are done
by assigning responsibilities to system components or architectural
modules. This process creates responsibility zones within the sys-
tem architecture. A similar idea is encouraged in UCM (USE-CASE
MAPS) methodology [35] which is a popular system modelling pro-
cess for the complex architecture of interconnected systems. More
in depth discussion on the UCM can be found in Chapter-3.
Figure 3.4: Isolation of Functionalities and communication failure points
Figure 3.4 shows a typical setup for the POCT communication links,
using the Arduino open-source modules. POCT device module is
the core of the testing processes which executes as-says based on the
commands received from the G-Node. The resulted test data will be
transferred to the P-Cloud via the Ethernet module. There are inter-
nal communication links shown as Link 2, 3 and 4. When the data is
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transmitted, the data path will be Link-4 (internal)...Ethernet-
Link...Link-1(external)...Link-5(external)...Link-6 (exter-
nal). Link 2 (internal) and Link 3 (internal) are used for interfacing
with the SD cards. Failure points are indicated as ground symbols.
If the complete system is built in one single module, then any of the
failures will shut down the entire module. By having isolated mod-
ules as shown in the Figure, link failures can be managed effectively
and this system will not lead to a single point failure. System func-
tional boundaries are indicated by dotted lines. In other words, the
functionalities are independent of each other with internal communi-
cation links. Upgrading system software also becomes easy with the
isolated and interconnected module architecture. Functional testing
is also effective with the isolated functional architecture.
3.3.3 Creating loosely coupled modules
The loosely coupled system is a product of the isolated and in-
terconnected architecture. The loosely coupled system has many
advantages in service-oriented architecture [64–66]. This helps to
implement the system independently because of the nature of the
loosely coupled system. In practical terms, this kind of system ar-
chitecture allows more stable and dependable products as the faults
or fatal errors in one subsystem will not impact the other system
components. The interaction between loosely coupled systems is
vital for producing desired system behaviour as per the system re-
quirements. This communication between the loosely coupled sys-
tem components should be of asynchronous messaging to maintain
non-interdependency. The following paragraphs explain how this is
implemented in the system architecture.
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The loosely coupling implementation in the devices is used both in
software and hardware components. The internal communication
in the Arduino stackable system uses multiple technologies depend-
ing on the vendors of the module. In general they use SPI (Serial
Peripheral Interface Bus), I2C (Inter-Integrated Circuit), and Serial
(Serial Communication) (or similar interface which is available in
open source hardware) to share common data. This will provide the
following advantages:
• Independent systems operation (i.e., each module can function
on its own)
• The system has high fault tolerance, or the faults can be con-
tained within the subsystem boundaries
• The safety classifications (system partitioning) scan be applied
easily as per the IEC 62304, the standard for the medical device
software life cycle process.
• The system can be easily validated and verified as sub-system
units and single End-2-End system.
• This type of system design paves the way for the expandable
system (encouraging scalability) whenever requirements changes
or the device needs to interface with 3rd party systems.
When designing mission critical systems such as medical devices, the
couplings (hardware based or software based) need to be minimized
in order to eliminate single point failures which will impact the whole
system. This includes assigning hardware architectures to multiple
hardware modules or platforms. The loosely coupled systems help
internal communication within the device.
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Figure 3.5 shows the complete end-to-end topology of the commu-
nication system (using Arduino stackable modules) which was de-
veloped [32] . The principle of isolating the functionalities and as-
signing the functionalities to multiple hardware modules is followed
in developing the topology. Link 1connects the router to the Ether-
net interface, Link 2 and Link 3 enable SD storage, Link 4 provides
Ethernet connectivity, Link 5 connects router to the MODEM, Link
6 enables Internet link, Link 7 provides touchscreen access, Link
8 provides Bluetooth connectivity, Link 9 enables 2G cellular com-
munication, Link 10 provides external 3G cellular connectivity and
GPS data, Link 11 enables user with keyboard interface, Link 12
creates internal communication path with the POCT core module
and provides access to the P-Cloud via cellular connectivity. Thus
the internal communication links are identified within the HW com-
ponents. This isolated architecture helps to recover errors quickly
during system operation (i.e. POC testing process) as well as main-
tenance of system modules. This also creates an environment for
testing the functionalities during the system integration tests, which
are done by verification and validation teams.
3.3.4 Actuation Channels and Actuation Confirmation Channels
G-Node needs to communicate with P-Node to control the device as
well as external links. Fol-lowing paragraph shows the implementa-
tion of the communication of the internal functions of the device.
There are external peripherals (e.g., coils and actuators) used in the
POCT device. Cross verification of activation of control outputs sig-
nals (via feedback) that drives the external peripherals needs to be
verified for all the outgoing actuation scenarios such as enabling coils
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Figure 3.5: End-to-End Topology (external and internal communication links)
or opening electromagnetic valves. The cross verification is used in
automated train control systems or autonomous cars (cite) - invari-
ably in all the mission critical and safety systems. This concept is
applied to POCT system. For the POCT system, an actuation /
feedback cross verification mechanism is developed. There are two
groups of control channels, ACH (actuation channel) and ACCH
(actuation confirmation channel) used. The actuation channel is
responsible for activating (e.g., setting a voltage to an actuator) a
peripheral. The actuation confirmation channel is responsible for
verifying if the actuation was successful. In the POCT system de-
sign, this will be accomplished by an actuation control word which is
16 bits variable and each bit (or group of bits) corresponds to a pe-
ripheral. This is be-cause some of the peripherals will need multiple
input signals to activate them. The actuation confirmation channel
has a corresponding word (a 16 bits entity) maps to the actuation
control word.
The flowchart in Figure 3.6 shows a way of implementing the concept
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in the software. The description of each block and the data flow are
shown.
Figure 3.6: Algorithm for Peripheral Activation
The explanation for each actions flowchart is described below:
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[a1, a2, a3]: Default state of the peripheral is read - which needs
to be activated, before the activation process function is called. The
control confirmation word which represents the default state of the
peripheral is acquired via the ACCH. Information pertaining to the
peripheral of interest is masked out from the control confirmation
word (also known as a status word).
[a4]: The control confirmation word is verified for the expected
state of the peripheral.
[a12]: Reset attempts will be made if the expected state of the con-
trol confirmation word is not correct. This process will be repeated
for a predefined number of times.
[a5]: If the status word is read and confirmed, then the peripheral
will be activated (to support a biological process, e.g., a coil is turned
on to generate required temperature).
[a6, a7, a8, a9]: The activation confirmation word will be read,
and it will be verified that the activation was successful. And the
process will continue.
[a7, a10, a11]: If the activation confirmation word indicates that
the peripheral was not activated correctly, then the process will be
aborted, an error log will be created and the user will be notified.
[a10, a11]: If the reactivation attempts failed, then an error log
will be created, the user will be alerted, and the process will be
aborted.
Table 3.2 shows an example of an 8-bit control (ACH control) word
and an 8-bit confirmation word (ACCH confirmation). The 1 indi-
cates logic high and 0 indicates logic low. The X means, it is a dont
care logic state with respect to the associated peripherals. There
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are three peripherals in the system (stepper motor, micro-pump and
micro-valve).
Table 3.2: Example of ACH and ACCH
Figure 3.7: Conceptual connection of ACCH and ACCH to stepper motor
Figure 3.7 shows logic connections between the actuation words which
are derived from the controller of the POCT device and the stepper
motor driver. For the discussion here, both ACH-0 and ACH-1 are
set to logic 1 (Table 2-2). These logic levels drive the stepper mo-
tor. Feedback from the stepper motor is sent back to the POCT
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controller via the ACCH word (BIT ACCH-0). The ACCH-0 in-
forms the POCT controller that the stepper motor has responded to
the controls ACH-0 and ACH-1. Thus the mission criticality of the
testing process is closely monitored to preserve the integrity of the
POCT process. Two other such mappings are shown in the table.
For mi-cro-pump, both ACH-2 and ACH-3 are used and the drive
logic levels are set to 1 and 0. The feed-back is received by ACCH-3.
The ACCH-3 will be set to 0 if the micro-pump operates properly.
For micro-valve, both ACH-6 and ACH-7 drive its inputs and ACCH-
6 and ACCH-7 receive confirmation from it. The signals marked X
are not used in the context of the connected peripheral. There are
many benefits of having this strategy: detecting component failures
before starting the tests; automated way of having component main-
tenance; a postmortem of success or failure of the device operation.
It also provides a guarantee in collecting accurate test measurement
data information and hence accurate diagnosis.
3.3.5 Security Principles for Designing Safety-Critical Software
Communication within the device boundary and external to the de-
vice must be governed by security principles. All access to user data
(measurement data and configuration data) must be approved by
the user and minimally a protected password must be enforced on
all interfaces that can access this data, including hardware inter-
faces. This includes protection of data removed or copied from the
device: memory dumps, cloud server access and other data storage.
The device is linked to a smart-phone (via Bluetooth) only when
the smart-phone access is authorized by the user. When the mea-
surement data is sent over to the P-Cloud, the database link (M2M
Machine to Machine communication link) access must be password
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protected. At any time, if there is an opportunity to improve secu-
rity at the: end-2-end system level; subsystem level; software and
hardware component level; software API level; data structure level -
required changes should be implemented. Relevant security require-
ments must be updated and they must be shared among all other
stakeholders during the life cycle of the device. If a design team finds
an opportunity for improving security, that information must be doc-
umented. After appropriate impact analysis, all the impacted teams
must be informed about the changes needed. The opportunity for
improving security must be encouraged regardless of the bottom-up
or top-down direction of the team hierarchy.
Some security experts believe that security through obscurity is one
of the security measures, which creates system design ambiguity to
confuse security attacks. However, this process of dis-closing system
design as insecure systems can lead to catastrophic security failure
[67]. Automation systems have relied on security through obscurity
to solve computer attacks problems. The tools needed to conduct
these attacks are easily obtainable for free, and the potential con-
sequences of an attack are large [68]. A system relying on security
through obscurity may have theoretical or actual security vulnera-
bilities. Therefore, obscurity should not be relied upon as part of the
security design, but can (and should) be used as a mitigation strategy
against unknown software bugs in the implementation. In general,
anything that would divert any attempts of hackers in turning a soft-
ware bug into exploitation must be avoided. In-depth details on the
security topic are discussed in Chapter-4.
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3.4 P-Cloud Architecture for Delivering an Error Free Sys-
tem
The following section explains the concepts of the P-Cloud. The
principle here is that the division of data boundaries is based on
the system usage model. It will guarantee creation of an error-
free computing environment with respect to data handling. Each
data repository can be accessed via separate gateways (Figure 3.8).
The gateways will connect to their partner entities in the G-Node
which is usually a smartphone. In the case of the POCT, there
are four gateways to get the access to appropriate databases in P-
Cloud. These gateways have machine to machine (M2M) interfaces
and user interfaces. The smartphone application developers will cre-
ate applications which will provide access to the gateway entities in
the P-Cloud.
The P-Cloud consists of mainly five classes of database reposito-
ries. They are noted as configuration (provisioning) data, measure-
ment data, data mining data, execution data and deployment da-ta.
Each of these classes of data are accessible via four different logi-
cal gateways: provisioning data gateway, measurement data gate-
way, operational data gateway and data mining data gateway. The
measurement data is the POCT data sent from the P-Node via the
POCT measurement data GW (gateway). The communication links
between the P-Node and the GW is normally categorized as M2M
type. Data mining database will be used by the clinicians for diag-
nosing. This database is an aggregat-ed version of the measurement
database. The data mining database will be accessible to data min-
ing application developers (data reporting tools) to provide suitable
data portals for the clinicians. Ac-cess to the data mining database
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Figure 3.8: P-Cloud data organization
is provided by the separate logical gateway. The measurement data
and data mining data segments are linked internally (can be done
by creating database table views or data warehouse).
Execution database will collect operational data. One of the key
needs for this database is to track the assay processes per device.
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The execution database will help to debug field issues and it will
help to log critical execution paths in the POCT device. The con-
cept here is that the logged data will help to identify any computa-
tional deviation for a particular POCT process. It is essential that
all the processes and their execution sequences in the device (which
is a mission critical device) should be documented and assigned la-
bels. In the POCT, a particular process or a set of processes will
provide measurement data that pertain to a test. There will be a
set of documented execution paths in the design that will accom-
plish test results. If the documented execution paths differ during
a POCT, the test will not be valid. The execution path data which
will be logged in the database will reveal any execution deviations
against the expected execution for a given test. This process will
not only help to remove any errors in software coding during system
acceptance testing (before launching the system), but will also be an
essential tool for the field engineering team. By analyzing the exe-
cution data logs, the field engineering team will be able to pinpoint
the root cause of any issues during actual operation of the system.
The execution log database will be accessible to the field team and
the POCT devices in the system.
Configuration database is a place for storing POCT device provi-
sioning data. This will be accessible to the device (via M2M link)
and reachable by various health care providers and lab associates.
This database will have all the configured data of the devices. The
deployment database will have the information about the association
of the device and the G-nodes that can access the device. It is possi-
ble that the association between the device and the G-Node can be
one-to-one or one-to-many (one device and many kinds of G-Nodes
such as smart-phones, PC and any user computing devices). The
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configuration database will only have the configuration that pertain
to the device and the deployment database will only have the asso-
ciated data. The configuration and deployment databases share a
common device provisioning gateway.
The principles here are to segregate the data boundaries for different
databases and to avoid any logical errors and execution errors. The
access privileges to each gateway provide adequate security bound-
aries for data privacy. These databases are independent of each other
with the minimal association. The commercially available cloud ser-
vices can be configured to provide a P-Cloud as dis-cussed in the
above sections. A summary of the P-Cloud structure and access is
also shown in Table 2-3.
Table 3.3: P-Cloud and Access Gateways
Security groups are used to control the access of the users. As shown
in the Table, P-Node is a member of security group GP2. It has ac-
cess to Measurement data via the Measurement data GW. Physicians
(member of security group GP3) have access to Data mining data
via Mining portal GW. P-Node and the provisioning agencies (both
are part of security group GP1) have access to Configuration data
and Deployment data via Provisioning GW. P-Node and the Field /
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system engineers (both the users are part of the security group GP4)
have access to Execution data via Operational GW.
Thus, the security groups play a major role in providing the access
to the data in P-Cloud. The security grouping provides segrega-
tion of data segments for maintaining data boundaries. An in-depth
discussion on the data security is discussed in Chapter-4.
3.5 Benefits of adopting IEC 62304 at early stages of de-
velopment
Figure 3.9: IEC 62304 process [Standard: Introduction]
POCT system communication software is the key part of the system.
The software must fulfil the requirements for realizing control and
communication functionalities with acceptable risks. IEC62304 is a
framework for developing and maintaining mission critical software
for medical devices. It was initially released in 2006, and it specifies
the life cycle requirements for the software based on the safety criti-
cality of system functionalities. It defines the life cycle requirements
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for software. Currently, it is a harmonized EU standard, which is
approved by the FDA as a recognized standard for safety-critical
system development. It uses ISO 14971 to do risk analysis. The
development process described by the standard is shown in Figure
3.10 [IEC 62304 standard: introduction].
Sections 5.1 - 5.8 describe a general guideline for the software system
development activities. The Standard can be referred to for specific
items.
There are three classes (Class A, B and C) of the software safety
[IEC62304: section 4.3] based on the level of risks or hazard pre-
sented to the patient and users. This is based on the level of severity
concerning the injury or damage to the individual. The Standard
defines the term SERIOUS INJURY (wrong diagnosis by the device
due to malfunction of communication links) as a life threatening situ-
ation, which will result in permanent damage to the bodily functions,
and needs a medical intervention to prevent any impairment of the
body. If there is no injury or damage to health, the system software
is classified as Class A. If there is a possibility of NON-SERIOUS
IN-JURY, then it is classified as Class B. In the case of death or
SERIOUS INJURY, then it is classified as Class C. Class C is the
highest risk and serious situation as defined by the Standard. Rig-
orous development processes need to be followed as defined by the
Standard [IEC62304: chapter 5.0].
In Figure 3.10 the subsystems of the POCT device are identified
using the safety classifications based on the definitions provided in
the Standard. The core module is classified as class C because the
POCT process is done with various constraints and controls. Table
Chapter 3 92
Figure 3.10: Architecture Partitioning and IEC62304 Classification
A.1 [ISO 62304: Annex A.2] shows the development process require-
ments by the safety classification. Class C has additional process
requirements compared to Class A and B. Any failure in the steps
will lead to wrong generated data and could lead to a false diagnosis.
The architectural partitioning of the POCT device is developed,
based on class definition of the Standard. The functional modules
are segregated as Class A, B and C based on the health risks to the
user of the system. The user interfaces: keypad display and touch
screen are classified as Class A. The communication links and the as-
sociated modules: Ethernet, GSM, 3G and GPS radio are classified
as Class C . The core of the system is classified as Class A. There
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are two main approaches that can be used to segregate the system:
hardware approach and software approach. The software approach
is tied directly to operating system parameters. The important op-
erating system parameters are as follows: task isolation, restricted
memory access, CPU / time protection, exception handling and vir-
tualization. If an embedded OS is used in the design, the first three
parameters can be set easily. The exception handling needs to be
done at the application code level. The virtualization helps to create
a separate partition over the functionalities.
Securing the compliance with the IEC62304 development process has
many benefits which include the development of error-free software.
During the project cycle, a software development plan must be main-
tained, and it should reflect the changes, and it must provide a real
picture of the activities. All the team members must be aware of the
plan, and they must follow the plan. Software risk assessment must
be done based on the ISO 14971 and risk should be mitigated. The
risk management activities should be given importance and must be
performed during the design phase.
Hazard identification is developed at the early stage of the devel-
opment cycle by looking for opportunities to isolate and contain
critical elements of the system to reduce the number of critically
classed components. The effective system design (error-free system)
and software partitioning are driven by two main goals: building a
safe and effective system and minimizing development complexity
and cost. Thus, the architecture segregation is key to risk isolation.
The software architecture breaks the medical device software down
into smaller modules. These modules have a defined function and
can be classified based on their functional role in the system. The
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system integration test must be conducted at the early stages of the
project to mitigate any interface issues.
The Standard specifies the degree of the software development pro-
cess rigour based on the established classification. It places addi-
tional focused attention on the use of third-party software, known
as Software with an Unknown Pedigree (SOUP). The device manu-
facturer must take full responsibility for the entire software stack
(including SOUP) [IEC62304: sections: 5.1.1, 5.1.5, 5.1.7, 5.2.2,
5.3.3-3.4, 5.3.6, 6.1, 7.1.2, 7.1.3, 7.4.1-4.2 8.1.1-1.2]. All the known
bugs in the SOUP must be enumerated, and the intended use and
conditions for SOUP must be stated. The risks need to be identified
by analyzing the failure modes and mitigated for the SOUP portion
of the software stack. The configuration management for the SOUP
must be implemented. The importance of evaluating SOUP modules
is mentioned in the Standard very strongly.
With these recommendations, delivery of the error-free software for
the medical device and its maintenance after the first product release
can be managed.
3.6 Using Combinatorial Design Methodology for Gener-
ating Smart Testing Vectors
The combinatorial design methodology will help to identify the ba-
sic and essential test vectors that are required for verifying the sys-
tem [69–74]. There will be many possibilities that can be validated.
However, it is not possible to test all the possibilities within a given
short cycle of testing available. Combinatorial testing is an adaptable
methodology which is useful in a wide range of situations to uncover
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Table 3.4: Benefits of Combinatorial Testing Process
software defects. It is based on the statistical process that while the
behaviour of a software system may be affected by a large number of
factors, only a few factors are dominant in inducing software failures
[75].
There are two main reasons for the large number of software defects
in the design and implementation of Safety critical systems: a system
with complex requirements and absence of software verification tools.
Exhaustive system testing which covers all the use case scenarios is
hard within the allocated testing time. Manually identifying the
highly probable complex combination of inputs of the system under
test is impossible because of the combinatorial explosion in the great
number of states that an SCS can reach when it executes [76].
Table 3.4 shows a comparison between manual and combinatorial
testing process. The combinatorial design-based approach offers a
way of testing the system with fewer key inputs. This process will
build structured variation into testing scenarios. The structured vari-
ation focuses on creating almost all the key subsystem behaviours.
Most of the issues are triggered by one or two entities in the sys-
tem, and this process will engage all possible two-way interactions
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(or combinations).
3.6.1 Application of combinatorial testing process in POCT system
The combinatorial testing methodology was used to identify the crit-
ical test cases for validating the communication system. Having the
minimal number of critical test cases will provide early detection of
communication failures.
Figure 3.11: System under test
There are numerous open source tools available for combinatorial
testing. Pairwiser is a combinatorial design tool developed by Induc-
tive, which is based in Norway [1]. A system configuration shown in
Figure 3.11 was considered for demonstrating test case generation.
There are two P-Nodes, a G-Node and a P-Cloud are configured for
POCT operation. The test generation focuses on the communication
links between the nodes.
Figure 3.12: UI (User interface) of Pairwise tool [4]
Figure 3.12 shows the UI (user interface) of the tool which has multi-
ple sections: Define Parameters, Required Tests, Generate Tests and
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Analysis Tests. The Test Script Template and Test Scripts are not
required for the current discussions. They are meant for developing
test scripts depending on the testing environment.
Figure 3.13: Input data model [4]
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Figure 3.13 shows possible (configured) radio technologies for the
communication links under consideration as shown in Figure 3.13.
This is also known as input data model of the system under test. It
defines all the configurable radio technologies possible in each link.
The constraint segment defines that when the WLAN is used by P1-
Node, P2-Node should not use WLAN in order to avoid coexistence
issues.
Figure 3.14: Seeding Process [4]
Figure 3.14 shows the seeding process (seeding of required input
data combinations) of the system under test. This process helps the
testing team to assert any known input combinations that need to
be verified. The net result is that Test 1(WLAN, 4G, 4G, and BT)
will be added to auto-generated test vectors in the next step. The
identified input combinations are then used with the generated test
vectors as must test cases.
The tests case (or test vector) generation step (Figure 3.15) lists the
test vectors. This is generated by the tool using the input data model
provided. Note that an option is available to change combinatorial
coverage dimension to 3, 4 or mixed mode. The figure shows the
2-wise coverage dimension. The 2-wise coverage dimension is quite
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adequate in identifying the test vectors that give at least 95 percent-
age functional coverage.
Figure 3.15: Test Vector Generation [4]
The test analysis (Figure 3.16) predicts cumulative functional cov-
Figure 3.16: Coverage Analysis [4]
erage of 100 percentage with twenty test cases. Note that there is
no need to run all the possibilities (120 test cases) to accomplish 100
percentage coverage. The number of possible tests grows rapidly
as more parameters and values are added to the parameter defini-
tion. For 2-wise test vector generation, use of the number of valid
and possible pairs of values, resulted in 71 test vectors. The valid
number of tests indicate that the possible combination of tests with
2-wise (pair-wise) selection exist among the input parameters. The
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combinations pairs must be chosen from two different input param-
eters. It is invalid to select the values from the same parameter.
On the whole, the process of test case generation using combinato-
rial methodology does safe test execution time and 100 percentage
coverage is possible, which is important for POCT device system
validation.
3.7 Agile Project Management Approach in Developing
POCT systems
3.7.1 Project Management in IEC62304
The requirements are elicited from the stakeholders: bio-medical ex-
perts, mechanical engineers, user interface engineers, physicians and
system engineers. The scope of the requirements were allowed to
change during the research because of a new finding or new out-
comes. In the POCT system development, Agile Project Manage-
ment [77–79] allows for flexibility of delivering interim software. The
system was developed using stackable open source hardware mod-
ules. Effective integration of the modules is possible because of the
multiple incremental phases of development by adding communica-
tion modules.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, a system design methodology is shown which de-
scribes the benefit of creating the basic system building blocks for
the end to end system. This process highlights the importance of
having a clear architectural view of the system. There are some
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key strategies such as isolation of system modules; need for creating
a loosely coupled system and its benefits; actuation and actuation
confirmation channel and an algorithm for implementation are pre-
sented. The goal of these approaches is to develop an error-free
POCT communication software system that can be used in medical
diagnosis environments as an independent system. These strategies
help to produce a product with highly predictable behaviour.
The role of security in safety critical system (in the context of the
POCT) is presented. Some of the operational scenarios pertaining to
the operation of the POCT device may cause security risks and the
process of mitigating those risks is presented. The security aspects
will be discussed in chapter 4.
A cloud-based architecture is presented to manage five types of data
that is relevant to the POCT system. A gateway for data access
concept is described. This will separate the implementation of the
database design and the associated applications. The segregation
will provide data access boundaries that will eliminate any software
implementation errors; hence the system will be deemed dependable
for the POCT operations.
The strategies and methods discussed in this chapter will guarantee
the delivery of high-quality software for safety and mission critical
systems, in particular the development of POCT device system com-
munication software. The processes: requirement elicitation method-
ology, Agile Project Management method, combinatorial testing pro-
cess and the development strategies presented in this chapter have
many advantages over the traditional software development and sys-
tem testing processes. The Combinatorial testing process will help
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to contain any software defects before the product launch or mainte-
nance upgrades. This can be done with fewer resources and relatively
less testing time than the traditional testing processes.
The Value-Based Requirement eliciting process provides key-value
attributes which will directly resolve real requirements needed for the
POCT system. Due to the fact that it provides measurable attributes
to the requirement, the implementation can be validated without
any ambiguities. In other words, the behaviour of the system can be
described with measurable requirement attributes. The importance
of having measurable requirements attributes has been highlighted
as a key factor to the development of highly predictable systems
such as POCT. There is a need to link system architecture to the
system requirements of the POCT system because of the importance
of traceability in the architecture design. In the next chapter, a
methodology for system architecture design, Use Case Maps with
links to the requirements are presented.
Chapter 4
Security Framework for Managing
Data Security within Point of
Care Tests
4.1 Introduction
With the exponential rise in clinical devices such as POCT instru-
ments [32], clinical network security has become a major issue for
biomedical teams and healthcare organizations [80]. Because of the
need for multiplexed detection of viral and bacterial infections with-
out easy access to a lab, management of future outbreaks will become
more involved with the compact portable point of care test devices
[81]. Based on the State of the Internet report published by Akamai,
Port 80 was the top targeted port by advisories in the US [82]. In ad-
dition, Port 443 [83] based attacks were seen primarily in Indonesia
[82]. Port 80 is for the application based on HyperText Transfer Pro-
tocol (HTTP), and use of port 443 is for the applications based on
HTTPs (Secure-HTTP). Targeting ports 80 and 443 implies that the
advisories were targeting web-based applications (both HTTP and
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HTTPs), which are very popular among smartphone users. Smart-
phones use medical applications based on the web and it is device-
specific. Clinical instruments and devices such as POCT instruments
that connect via the smartphone grew more than 60 percentage in
2012 [80]. As more devices are added, there is an increasing concern
with respect to security of the data transmitted in a clinical setup.
The POCT systems can be classified into three broad categories as
shown in Figure 1: testing, healthcare monitoring and alert, and
interfacing with other existing health monitoring devices. All classes
of devices need to have strategies and processes to deal with security
concerns.
The current ways of providing security are specific to applications,
e.g., the process for IoT related security proposals are available. The
authentication process that is applicable to IoT is described in Srini-
vas, Mukhopadhyay, and Mishra [84]. A proposal for secure com-
munication protocol specifically for the healthcare IoT also has been
discussed in reference [85]. A general security framework to address
IoT security issues has been outlined in Huang et al [86]. The need
to authenticate the user, the system, methods, and processes are
evolving [87]. A method for preventing energy depletion security
attacks with ZigBee is explained in Cao et al [88]. A review of se-
curity challenges and existing architectures in the fast-growing IoT
system and it has been documented [89]. The important need for
having a holistic security framework is mentioned in [90]. Though
cloud-based storage for medical data is convenient, accessing data
from the cloud has security issues, and the data must be accessed
securely [91]. The IoT security can be accomplished in many ways,
including using the HW and biometrics defence [92]. The challenges
of developing m-Health securely for defending the privacy of the user
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community is one of the key aspects of interconnected medical sys-
tems [93]. It is crucial to have security systems able to work with
multiple interconnected systems that may use multiple communi-
cation technologies [94]. There is a need to enhance the security of
communication links for any IoT type of system, in order to preserve
the patients anonymity [95].
Figure 4.1: Device usage categories
Therefore, having a security framework independent of communica-
tion technologies and medical applications that is flexible enough to
use universally is important. The security framework presented may
be used within a hospital network scenario or any other healthcare
clinical establishment where POCT is car-ried out remotely. This
chapter provides a security framework that can be used in the con-
text of the POCT devices, system, and networks. The framework is
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independent of SW and HW of the POCT device.
POCT devices and systems can be categorized into three broad
classes (CAT 1, CAT 2, and CAT 3) based on the context of op-
eration and usage as shown in Figure 4.1. The categories are defined
to address certain usage models of the POCT device. The devices
that are used for POC testing and diagnostic ap-plications (POCT)
are defined CAT 1 devices; the devices that are used for patient
monitoring are de-fined as CAT 2 devices (POCM); the devices that
are used for as interfacing with other devices are de-fined as CAT 3
devices (POCI). The POCI devices provide an interface gateway for
collecting and ag-gregating data from other medical devices. In all
categories, data security is an important aspect.
As mentioned above, Point of Care devices and systems can be cat-
egorized into three main classes, based on their operation and usage
contexts. The use of the point- of- care (POC) for testing and di-
agnostic applications (POCT), category one; use of the POC for
patient monitoring (POCM), category two; and use of the POC as
an interface gateway (POCI) for collecting and aggregating data.
In all categories, data security is an important aspect. This chap-
ter presents a security framework concept that is applicable to any
of the categories of POCT operation. It outlines the concepts and
framework for preventing security challenges in unauthorized access
of data, unintended data flow, and data tampering during communi-
cation, both between system enti-ties and between the user and the
POCT system. This framework includes secure layering of the basic
POCT system architecture, protection of POCT device in the con-
text of application, and network and at-tack tree (thread model) for
the system. A proposal for a low-level security protocol is discussed.
This pro-tocol is independent of communication technologies, and it
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is elaborated in relation to providing security. A mechanism that can
be used to overcome the threat challenges has been shown using the
elements in the protocol. The chapter further discusses a vulnerabil-
ity scanning process for the systems interconnected network. Finally,
the chapter provides a summary highlighting the M2M security point
of view and dis-cusses the main players in a real deployment of the
POCT system and its security challenges.
4.2 POCT System Configurations
4.2.1 Architecture Layering
There are three high-level layers, as shown Figure 4.2. The P-Node
represents a POCT device; the G-Node represents a smartphone or
another device used for accessing the POCT device, and the P-Cloud
represents the data collection endpoint. The three layers outlined
here form the basis for security portioning.
Consider the following POCT system configurations or operational
scenarios: The P-Node communicates with the P-cloud without any
intermittent gateway entities such as smartphones.
Integration of the P-Node and the G-Node as one single unit; i.e.
the G-Node, which is a smartphone, has all the required sensors and
control built into, conduct the POCT processes.
In the first case, the POCT device and associated infrastructure com-
bined provide security function-ality. In the 2nd case, the G-Node
together with the associated infrastructure assures security. In both
in-stances, a layered model requires a partition strategy that protects
all components in the network (POCT devices, network equipment,
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Figure 4.2: High-Level architecture layers
secure gateway and secure clouds). This layering approach provides
physical security for the end- to -end system. The layering approach
architecture needs to be developed dependent upon the POCT sys-
tem deployment.
4.2.2 Security Layering
A balanced approach to ensuring security should be in place for the
system. The POCT system is inter-connected, and all the elements
in the configured network must have individual security boundaries
(or layers) as shown in Figure 4.3. All secrets stored on the device
are unique to that device. This will prevent any compromises to the
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Figure 4.3: Secure layering of the basic architecture
whole system occurring in one device or a sub-system within the de-
vice. Development effort and cost should not be factors in deciding
security protection strategies. A less costly device and an expensive
de-vice must be treated equally with respect to security protection.
The designers and architects provide the layering security architec-
ture for the POCT device and system infrastructure. The system
implementers of the POCT device and the service providers must
ensure that updated security technologies and security products are
used to secure data on the POCT device and its associated network
infrastructure. A management layer for administrative functions and
organizational policies ensures that the patient uses the POCT sys-
tem deployment securely. Service operators involved in the system
deployment use the management layer to configure security and pri-
vacy policies on the system infrastructure. As shown in Figure 4.3,
all the partitioned layers of security coexist to provide secure data
transfer between key entities (P-Node, G-Node, and P-Cloud).
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4.2.3 Definition of Asset in POCT system
Within the system domain, an asset is the value of data collected
from patients during POCT. A threat model [96, 97] aids under-
standing of any potential threat scenarios and threat agents who are
deemed likely to carry out a threat. The model shows the threat
paths for the POCT system.
4.2.4 Attack tree for POCT System
The security threat model needs to be reviewed and evaluated on a
continual basis, as good security countermeasures applicable yester-
day may not be applicable tomorrow. An attack tree [98, 99]has been
built for analyzing the POCT system security implications (Figure
4.4).
Figure 4.4: Threat path tree (Attack tree)
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The threat path tree is divided into three levels. Level-1 represents
accessing P-Node. Level-2 and 3 are illegal paths to gain access
to the P-Node. Path-1 shows two ways: users G-Node is loaded
with the non-hardened operating system and use of an unapproved
application on G-Node, either of which can com-promise security on
G-Node, which creates an unauthorized access to P-Node. Path-
2 shows two ways: accessing G-Node by stealing the password and
watching over the authorized user when he or she logs on to G-Node,
which will then provide an illegal entry to P-Node. Path-3 shows that
an intruder can redirect the data collected to a fake P-Cloud server
for accessing user data. Path-4 shows the possibility that P-Node
can be stolen by an unauthorized user for accessing the measurement
data stored on the P-Node. Path-5 shows that an illegal G-Node can
access the P-Node to steal users personal credential data. And there
are more threat paths possible, so appropriate countermeasures need
to be in place to mitigate the risks of unauthorized access. Section
4.4 shows the processes for creating such countermeasures for POCT
system.
The Freeport scanner shows that the ports have been configured as
filtered (using open source tool [100]: Network Mapper, also known
as Nmap). The state is defined either as open and filtered or closed
and unfiltered. Open means that an application on the target ma-
chine is listening for connections or packets on that port. Filtered
means that a firewall, filter, or another network activity is blocking
the port. Therefore, Nmap cannot determine whether the port is
open or closed. The closed ports have no application listening to
them (they are available to use), and an application can open them
at any time [101]. Ports are identified as unfiltered when they are re-
sponsive to the Nmap probes. However, the Nmap cannot determine
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whether they are open or closed [101].
The setup configuration used to experiment with the Nmap port
scanning tool is shown in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Port scanning setup
Figure 4.6 displays the configuration of the Nmap tool.
Figure 4.6: Configuration of Port scanning tool
Figure 4.7 shows the output of a sample scan run
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Figure 4.7: Scanned Results
4.3 Security Compromising Scenarios
In the POCT domain, an intruder targets applications run on the
P-Node or G-Node that may range from web application attacks to
client-side attacks and buffer overflow attacks [102]. Physical secu-
rity of the on-board data must be safeguarded carefully, as the POCT
device will contain clinical test data that belongs to the user. If a
device is opened physically, it should not provide any more access
to the data contained within the device than if it is logically acces-
sible through the user interface or external ports without opening
the device. Circuit level attacks on the device should be unfeasible,
and the minimum bar to a hardware-based attack on the user data
should be a silicon level attack.
The POCT devices can be misused for their access capabilities by
attackers pretending to be the back-end application server. A sce-
nario in which such an attack could be of some economic value to
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the attack-er is the sale of POCT data or the use of the POCT de-
vice to gain control over other devices or systems. By pretending
to be the POCT application server, attackers can penetrate other
barriers and reach other business applications (such as mobile bank-
ing applications) on the user’s devices. The POCT devices (G-Node
and P-Node) must be protected from unauthorized entities trying to
establish communications to and from them.
The data collected from the M2M-enabled POCT devices are sensi-
tive in nature. For example, the data may contain information that
can be used against the user by insurance organizations. Thus, the
M2M POCT system security solution must be designed such that it
is not possible to acquire information about the stored data by eaves-
dropping at any point within the network. The security framework
in section 4.4 ensures prevention of any such attempts to access the
network in an unauthorized way.
Identity information can be correlated with other data, such as the
networks location data elements from which the identification data is
retrieved, to discern some patterns. In the case of POCT system the
identity of the end-customer not be available from a public database
is critically important [41]. Therefore, the device should not transmit
unencrypted data relating to the user identity [41]. Well-known,
robust encryption mechanisms must be used, rather than reinventing
new algorithms [103].
Low-cost health care devices such as heart rate monitors are required
to send data collected by a server in a single data connection session.
This design can be easily compromised by clever adversaries [41].
The proposed architecture model in Section 5 encourages multiple
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communication sessions to be established with the main network
entities before the data access is granted.
The POCT device is a non-mobile entity in the system. Moreover,
physically accessing the device without authorization causes three
main problems. Firstly, the data can be taken from the SD card.
Secondly, the credentials from the UICC (Universal Integrated Cir-
cuit Card or SIM card) can be taken if the device has a cellular access
interface. Thirdly, since there is no need for the hand-offs (device
mobility is not required) to different base stations or radio access
network, the intruder can easily identify the associated network and
hence the device identity.
It is essential that appropriate SLA (service level agreements) be-
tween all stakeholders involved be in place prior to system deploy-
ment, and this must include security as one of the main items. The
integrity of data stored in the POCT device after the testing process
can be tampered. It is possible to masquerade as another POCT
device and upload incorrect data to the P-Cloud.
4.3.1 Processing Data in POCT devices
Scenario: Where will the data process/generate results stage take
place? The options are the POCT device or the server (P-Cloud).
The data process needs to take place on the server (the other end
of the SSL tunnel) domain where the computing power can be more
than the POCT device.
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4.3.2 Access from multiple devices (Preventing Unauthorized Access)
Scenario: How can we ensure a one-to-one relationship/connection
between a particular user and the testing device? The one-to-one
relationship can be guaranteed using logic similar to that illustrated
in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Multiple Device Access
4.3.3 User authentication
4.3.3.1 User validation and User Identification
There are two methodologies that can be used for user validation
and user identification.’ User validation is a process of comparing
two data sets, while user identification is a process of using other data
sets (databases) to identify the user. The choice of authentication
method is based on the environment in which the device is used.
This selection can be set in the OMAP module. The result of this
would be to set security information data (in the communication
protocol) sent between the POCT device and G-Node, to reflect this
configuration.
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4.3.3.2 Authentication using biometric
The biometric authentication process uses the user validation method-
ology. In this method, the user presents his or her credentials, and
the device compares what is presented with the user profile informa-
tion stored in the device.
4.3.3.3 Authentication using Active Directory
The active directory (AD) technology is an authentication mecha-
nism developed by Microsoft.
When the user tries to log on to the device, a security challenge is
communicated from the AD server to authenticate the user. The
user can also log on to the device with the cached data (user profile
info in the device) when there is no connection to the AD. For the
AD to work, there needs to be packet data net-work connectivity via
cellular network or WLAN to the AD server.
4.3.3.4 Clinical and Surveillance data collection
Scenario: Will the data (clinical and surveillance) be collected before
the results of the test are presented to the user?
Table 4.2: Clinical and Surveillance
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The data collection will happen when the test completion bit is set.
This will be the trigger event for the smart-phone application to ini-
tiate the data collection. This means that the POCT device must
have the capacity to store the collected data during the testing pro-
cess, which will simplify the SW implementation. This is shown in
Table 4.2 .
4.3.3.5 Safely dispose of the testing device
Scenario: Will the user be advised to safely dispose of the testing
device once the test is complete?
An approach to accomplish this requirement is to have the smart-
phone app (or the apps running on G-Node) register with the POCT
device for the completion event of the testing. This will enable the
POCT device to send the testing event complete type packet to the
smart-phone. Then the smartphone app can indicate the test com-
pletion to the user by a visual or sound indication via UI (User
Interface).
4.3.3.6 Mechanical method
If the user attempts to use the device cartridge again, a mechanism
can be implemented to prevent this by mechanical means. Some of
the options that can be used are using material properties of the
cartridge and with paper microfluidic devices, it is only one-time
usage.
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4.3.3.7 On device usage prevention using SW
If the whole POCT device needs to be destroyed after one-time use,
then this can be done in SW; a usage indication bit can be stored
to indicate that the device has been used once. This needs to be
stored in the ROM area (non-volatile memory). Whenever the user
attempts to use the disposable device for the second time, the SW
will prevent the user using the device.
4.3.3.8 More complex and fail-proof mechanism for preventing (or restrict-
ing) device usage
Another alternative is to compare the device ID for the history (in
a database) before the device is used. For this, we need to have the
network connectivity at the beginning of the test. The FDA provides
guidelines on usages that are outlined for the device identification
process [17]. This will also prevent any illegal resale of the POCT
devices.
4.3.4 Web-based POCT System access
Web-based applications are one of the ways in which application de-
velopers create smartphone applications that will be used to control
the P-Node. One of the mechanisms to secure web applications is
to apply well-known security hardening patches for web servers and
provide adequate network protection.
Figure 4.8 shows the application of the Web server that was running
on the POCT device. The POCT device was situated behind a
firewall and a router. This configuration is an example of a protected
net-work behind a firewall.
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Figure 4.8: Embedded Web server with POCT
Web browsers are a readily available feature on any smartphone. An
embedded web server was implemented in the POCT device, and a
public Internet IP address was provided (via port forwarding at the
router) for access to the web server. The smartphone was able to
obtain the IP address to look at the POCT measurement data using
the embedded web browser.
Common web application attacks such as cross-site scripting, SQL
injection, XML injection, and command injection are also applicable
to POCT systems. Any HTTP request from the smartphone may
be subject to these common web attacks.
4.3.5 Cross-site scripting
In the cross-site scripting (XSS) attack in the context of POCT sys-
tem access, malicious instructions can be sent to the smartphone
browser. A standard browser cannot distinguish between valid code
and a malicious script, and it accepts user input without validation.
The main goal of the XSS is to steal information that is retained by
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the browsers. Therefore, it is necessary to have an approved browser
that is configured to run POCT web applications. The standard
browsers available on the smartphones are not advisable for access-
ing medical applications. There are secure frameworks available for
developing secure mobile embedded browsers [104]. There are many
techniques developed to secure browsers for data transfer [105]. Ap-
plications such as MedCheck [106] are needed on the smartphones for
POCT applications. For developing embedded secure web servers,
an architecture similar to the Sizzle platform is required to secure
POCT web servers [107].
4.3.6 SQL Injection
By entering an incorrectly formatted e-mail address, an attacker at-
tempts to analyze whether the input is being validated. Then the
attacker will use SQL statements to collect data from the database.
This illegal, unauthorized access to data can be prevented if all the
fields are validated in the HTTP website code. To ensure that the
data field validation is implemented, a mandatory requirement must
be created. This requirement will be implemented and tested before
the deployment of the web application.
4.3.7 XML Injection
HTML instructs the browser to display text in a particular format.
XML carries data instead of indicating how to display it using a pre-
defined set of tags, mostly defined by the user application. If the
website does not filter user data, it will be prone to XML tag injec-
tion. This process will modify data stored in the P-Cloud database.
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By implementing the requirement for data filtering, the XML injec-
tion attacks can be prevented.
A compromised G-Node will lead attacks on the web server that
resides within the POCT device. An attacker can gain access to
the operating system on the POCT device via the infected G-Node.
One of the HTTP header fields, the referrer field, indicates the site
that generated the web page. Attackers can modify this field to
hide that it came from another website (a website similar to POCT
device web server), a modified web page hosted from an attackers
computer. The accept-language field is another HTTP header; some
web applications pass contents of this field directly to the database
(P-Cloud). This field could be used to inject SQL commands to get
patient data.
4.3.8 Client-side attacks
So far, the attacks related to the web applications have been dis-
cussed. Server-side attacks and client-side attacks also target vulner-
abilities that exist in client applications. Examples of a client-side
attack are that the client application interacts with a compromised
server or the client initiates a connection to the server, which could
result in an assault.
The security of the G-Node, i.e. the client computer, can be compro-
mised simply by viewing a web page. Attackers can inject content




Malware is software [108] that enters a computer system without
the owners knowledge or consent. These are spread through com-
puter viruses and worms [109]. Trojans, rootkits, logic bombs and
backdoors are all forms of malware. Malware with a profit motive
includes botnets, spyware, adware, and keystroke loggers.
Social engineering [110] is a means of gathering information for an
attack from individuals. Types of social engineering approaches in-
clude phishing [111], impersonation [112], dumpster diving [113], and
tailgating.
Malware can be downloaded to the G-Node without the knowledge
of the user. Attackers develop a zero pixel frame to avoid visual de-
tection and embed an HTML document inside the main document.
When the browser used by the G-Node downloads a malicious script,
it instructs the G-Node to down-load malware. Therefore, it is crit-
ical that the G-Node must be loaded with suitable anti-malware
software to detect any malware downloads.
4.3.10 Cookie and Attachment Threats
Cookies store user-specific information on the G-Node. They are
used to identify repeat visitors; e.g., travel websites would store users
travel itinerary and personal information provided when visiting the
site. Only the website that created the cookie can read it.
There are a number of types of cookies. Website users create a first-
party cookie when they visit a web-site. Website advertisers use a
third-party cookie to record user preferences. A number of cookies
will also be used when a web-based POCT application is accessed
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on the G-Node. A few scenarios that involve the use of cookies are
outlined; a session cookie is stored in the RAM and expires when
the browser closes. The G-Node records a persistent cookie on its
drive, and the persistence cookie does not expire when the browser
closes. A secure cookie is used when a browser visits the server over
a secure connection, which is always encrypted. A flash cookie uses
more memory than a traditional cookie, and it can-not be deleted
through browser configuration settings. Given this wide range of
cookie types, cookies pose security and privacy risks and, if stolen,
can be used to impersonate a user and can, therefore, be exploited
by attackers to steal data from the G-Node.
Session hijacking is a malicious process used by an attacker to im-
personate a user by stealing or guessing the session token when the
G-Node communicates with the web server. To prevent these kinds
of at-tacks, the G-Node to P-Node and the G-Node to P-Cloud links
must be encrypted using well-known encryption algorithms.
Buffer overflow is an anomaly in the software code where the buffer
boundaries are not checked during data writing. An attacker uses
any buffer overflow to steal data by attempting to store data in
RAM beyond the boundaries of a fixed-length storage buffer, which
cause data overflow into adjacent memory locations. This attack
may cause the G-Node or the P-Node to stop functioning and open
an unintended pathway in which the attacker can change the return
address,” to redirect to an address containing malware code.
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Figure 4.9: Distributed Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks
4.3.11 Denial of Service (DoS)
The DoS attempts to prevent the system from performing normal
functions by pinging a flood attack, therefore, sending a large num-
ber of echo request messages, which in turn overwhelms the web
server. It is possible to send a ping request and alter the original IP
address, thus mimicking the target G-Node; therefore, an attacker
can acquire specific responses from all the devices connected to the
network. Dangerous attack types include the SYNC flood attack
and the DDoS (Distributed DoS [114] attack (Figure 4.9). In the
SYNC flood attack, the attacker takes advantage of procedures for
establishing a connection.
In the DDoS, the attacker uses many zombie G-Nodes (G-Nodes
connected to the Internet that has been compromised by a hacker)
to flood a device with requests from non-existent IP addresses. The
source of the attack is impossible to identify and, therefore, cannot
be blocked.
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In order to prevent any of the security attacks described above, the
POCT system network requires a separate entity for security man-
agement [115, 116]. The separate entity is a network element (S-
Node) for monitoring security. The S-Node is a specific kind of node
that needs to be updated with all the latest security signatures of
known vulnerabilities. DoS attacks can be prevented [117] by utiliz-
ing a static IP address (that is known to an administrative domain)
plan for POCT system deployments. Even if an attacker imitates
the DoS attack, this can be easily detected with the static IP con-
figuration.
4.4 Security Framework
There are many approaches available for providing security (mainly
for identity and data protection) for the POCT system environ-
ment. Methodologies and techniques already exist for providing
infor-mation protection in the industry. A list of few notable method-
ologies are listed here; a biometric-based identification, user identifi-
cation based on behavioural analytic process (including the Big Data
approach), challenge and response mechanism and the multiattribute
access process. The method is to establish a trust relationship with
the POCT system network nodes, especially the P-Node, G-Node,
and P-Cloud. The two, main approaches, a communication protocol
and security mechanisms, are outlined in the following sections.
4.4.1 The protocol used between the G-Node and the P-Node
A communication protocol can be used to help accomplish data se-
curity. In a closed system, the protocol format can contribute to
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providing security protection for the asset, which is the data col-
lected during the testing. Any violators will not be able to deter-
mine the data unless they have access to the protocol format (refer
Chapter-3).
4.4.2 Security Mechanism -1 (challenge and response based)
All device security measures originate from the device. Activation
of any security agent, security sub-system, or security service must
start from the device. It will then use the security services provided
by other collaborating entities in the system. For example, data
transport security is a function of the infra-structure. Whenever
the data is sent to the P-Cloud from the G-Node, its encryption
must be implemented using the security services provided by the
infrastructure.
Figure 4.10: Interaction of messaging mechanism
As shown in Figure 4.10, it is assumed that the network connectivity
between the three main nodes has been established. At this point,
the G-Node attempts to start a POCT process using a native appli-
cation or a web-based application. The OPCODE for START (refer
Chapter 3) is used to begin the assay process by the user. A security
challenge is sent to the G-Node from the POCT device to list the
operational capabilities of the device. These interactions are shown
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by [1] in Figure 4.10. The user device (which is the G-Node) will
respond with a list of known operational codes that are provisioned
by the operator. The POCT device selects a subset of OPCODEs
from the received list and queries the G-Node for the last known
list of OPCODEs. This particular information must come from the
P-Cloud. If the G-Node has the authorization to retrieve informa-
tion from the P-Cloud, then it can obtain the requested OPCODEs.
This interaction is depicted by [2] in Figure 4.10. User interaction
is shown as [3] .
Once the history of the operational codes is retrieved from the P-
Cloud, the G-Node informs the POCT with the OPCODEs list. If
the data matches the records in the POCT device, then the user
is allowed to continue the interaction with the POCT for testing.
Figure 4.11 shows a summary of the interactions.
Figure 4.11: Interaction summary
4.4.3 Security Mechanism -2 (behavioural based)
In this method, the user is first authenticated with the G-Node by the
standard methods such as the G-Node device password and network
password in order to access services. Step 1: shows the process of
user authentication with the gateway (G-Node) in Figure 4.12.
The next step (shown as Step 2: Application authorization) in-
volves establishing a security relationship with the POCT application
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Figure 4.12: Security Mechanism: Behavioural-based
authorization server. The POCT application authorization server is
responsible for providing approvals for the G-Node users to use a
particular application or a set of POCT applications. The appli-
cation authorization process is triggered when the user attempts to
start a POCT application from the G-Node (via G-Node user inter-
face). The authorization process requires few metadata attributes
that are related to actual data. There are metadata attributes avail-
able that can be used for the authorization process (e.g. an identifier
for the POCT application, a user identification parameter such as
SIM card and MEID [118] or IMEI [119] of the G-Node). These data
attributes must be validated by the POCT application server prior
to the testing.
The purpose of Step 3: (validation of previous trust relationship)
is an assertion and validation of the relationships that have existed
between P-Cloud, G-Node, and POCT device, prior to the current
test. This process is similar to the security mechanism in section
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4.4.2. An entity called the POCT process authorization server is
introduced, whose purpose is to manage who can execute certain
assay types on the POCT. The server is responsible for creating a
POCT authorization success certificate, which is an outcome of the
record of the validation process for step 3. Step 3 can be further
enhanced using Big Data techniques to identify the user. Step 4:
is the final step for successful validation.
To validate the security mechanisms shown in Figure 4.12 an ex-
periment setup is needed with a sample of users who can use the
devices to initiate testing. Using any simulation tools will not help
to validate the concept, because the interactions are based on user
behaviour. The validation of the mechanism at best can be done as
a system level test including some aspects of user acceptance test-
ing (UAT). It is possible to derive many test scenarios due to the
parameters involved in the design. The goal of the validation is to
verify if all the steps 1,2,3 and 4, are adequate to prevent any data
breach and security compromises. A poorly designed user interface
can cause the failure on the G-Node, or it can be a real rejection
from the application authorization server. The recommended rela-
tionship between G-Node and P-Node is 1:1, i.e. only one POCT
device able to connect to a specific G-Node. The application au-
thorization server has a database that contains a mapping of users
and authorized applications. The validation at this level is to test
how to avoid wrong entries the application authorization database.
If the user gains access because of the bad data entries, there must
be another defence to prevent the user from executing the test. The
steps described in the architecture can be done with user involve-
ment or without the user. In the case of automatic validation, the
user may not be in a position to influence the validation results, but
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privacy considerations need to agree among all parties involved. All
the possible communication links must be included in the valida-
tion processes. The recommended and efficient way to validate the
security mechanism is to apply the combinatorial methodology [75]
to come up with test scenarios which will guarantee as high as 90
percentage of functional coverage, because of the large number of
scenarios.
4.5 M2M (Machine-to-Machine) Security in POCT Sys-
tem
Deployment and operation of POCT systems are encompassed by
cellular or short-range communication M2M [120]technology. The
cellular M2M system differs from current cellular networks in three
important ways.
First, the cellular network services today are typically offered by a
single service provider who owns the distribution of devices with the
SIM card distribution, device provisioning, network infrastructure,
and service delivery for voice and data services. In contrast, with the
cellular M2M, multiple operators and network vendors offer services.
These players have limited business relationships among them.
For example, the entities involved in providing M2M solutions for
power metering are the utility company that provides application,
the cellular access network provider, the meter manufacturer, and
the end-user. These entities do not necessarily trust each other.
Hence, providing a security implementation in this environment is
very challenging.
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Secondly, M2M communication does not have intensive data trans-
mission that could lead to lower financial earnings for the players
involved. Fewer economic outcomes lead to less interest in imple-
menting a security related layer that is not cost effective.
Thirdly, unlike cellular phones, smartphones, or wireless-enabled lap-
tops, M2M devices are often unat-tended and are subjected to a
higher risk of malicious mischief and misuse. However, in the case
of POCT, there is a user who has ownership of the POCT device.
These dynamics among the main stakeholders suggest that the cur-
rent security mechanisms in place to-day for mobile devices in the
cellular networks are not appropriate for M2M applications.
The device manufacturer and the M2M service providers may not
have a business relationship or predefined mutual trust. The users
may buy devices on the open market. In the case of POCT mar-
ket, there are authorized drug stores or authorized medical device
dealers who are involved in the sales and market-ing of the devices
and services. In medical applications such as the POCT, the user
may not even be aware of the existence of a virtual network operator
who is providing the service on behalf of the owner of an organiza-
tion that owns a POCT application. However, securing usage of the
application is critical to all stakeholders.
4.5.1 Trust Relationships between POCT System entities
The following Table 4.3 shows the business relationships involved in
M2M service delivery for a POCT system. This scenario is applicable
for a POCT device at home as well as in the hospital. The health-
care or medical institution acquires POCT devices from a vendor
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company and distributes these to the end-users (end-consumers, the
patients) who have subscribed to the service. The healthcare institu-
tion owns and deploys the POCT devices in the homes or hospitals of
the end-consumers. The medical institution subscribes to the M2M
service from an M2M service provider for POCT data collection and
device management. The M2M service providers are usually the tele-
com carriers (operators, e.g. ATT [121]). The M2M service provider,
in turn, has business relationships with network providers (e.g. Er-
icsson [122]) for the use of bandwidth for transmission of data. The
table below shows the various entities and the relationships between
them. A similar table is used to describe the metering service [41].
Table 4.3: Main stakeholders and security relationships
Given the above summary, note that the complexity of the POCT
M2M ecosystem is strongly characterized by diverse business and
trust relationships, which cannot be accurately predicted during the
design of security solutions. For this reason, the security protocol
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design for M2M systems has to assume inherently that the M2M
service provider may not have trust relationships with other stake-
holders in the ecosystem. Therefore, a collection of suitable security
strategies for the case of M2M is required along with design recom-
mendations for appropriate security solutions in the context of the
POCT system design.
4.5.2 Core security requirements for POCT M2M
Based on the scenarios discussed above, a list of core security re-
quirements can be formulated [123].
• Authentication: Mutual authentication procedures need to be
carried out by the POCT device and the POCT system operator
network before initiating the testing and the data transfer.
• Confidentiality: Unauthorized data eavesdropping must be pre-
vented between the application server and the POCT device.
• Data Integrity: Unauthorized data manipulations or modifica-
tions must be prevented between all entities in the POCT sys-
tem.
• Exclusive Access: The POCT device must use only authenti-
cated POCT applications that are available from the apps providers
apps marketplace, and the network operator should prevent any
other use.
• Identity: The identity of the POCT device or the user must not
be revealed to any intruders in the event of security compro-
mises.
Chapter 4 135
4.5.3 Bootstrapping requirements for POCT device deployments
The bootstrapping process can be defined as initial processes that
must be run before the POCT device can be used for the test-
ing [124]. The POCT device ecosystem is complex in that it in-
volves security relationships that must be established between the
four key stakeholders (POCT Device Users, POCT Device, Network
Providers, M2M operators, and POCT Application Provider). Dur-
ing the bootstrapping process, the trust relationships between the
four main entities must be established successfully. The scalability
of the POCT devices deployment is a major factor, as the ecosystem
expands with the growth of the POCT device users. Registration
of the POCT device on a network needs to comply with the 3GPP
standards [125] (including specialized requirements specified by the
network providers and the operators [126]). The bootstrapping pro-
cess will start after the successful network registration. Due to busi-
ness reasons, the application provider or the POCT user may change
operators, and the bootstrapping process must ensure forward and
backward compatibility between the network operators, keeping the
network boundary agreements intact.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, security mechanisms that can be used for three main
POCT configurations (POCT for testing, POCT as the patient mon-
itoring device, and POCT as an interfacing device) are discussed. It
should be noted that the security mechanisms discussed here do not
depend on the mentioned configurations; this applies to POCT op-
eration and systems in general.
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An attack tree model is presented, considering the main assets that
are required to be secured, including the collected data. Port scan-
ning results are presented (using Nmap process) with the constructed
asset tree in a real scenario where the POCT is used within a se-
cure in-house environment. The purpose of showing the process is
to emphasize the need for the port scanning process for continuous
security validation of the POCT system. Any applications within
the POCT system potentially can create security violations if they
are conducted without security guidelines for developing POCT ap-
plications. A rigorous process for accepting any such applications
must be in place along with a security monitoring centre for POCT
installations.
The security concerns that are applicable to any web-based system
are very much applicable to POCT web-based systems. The use of an
embedded web server within the POCT is discussed with potential
security vulnerabilities such as cross-site scripting, SQL injection,
XML injection, and command injection.
Given that the vulnerability issues in the POCT system are un-
avoidable, methods (security framework) for managing security risks
have been discussed. The communication protocol developed (close
communication) for the POCT system is the first defence process for
securing the data asset. Two kinds of security mechanisms have been
discussed, challenge and response-based and data behavioural-based.
All the methods discussed here are independent of communication
technologies and Radio Access Technologies such as 2G, 3G, and 4G.
Finally, M2M security that applies to the POCT system discussed.
It is a good example of the M2M communication environment. The
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POCT system deployment depends on a successful working rela-
tionship among multiple stakeholders or entities ; the POCT device
users, the POCT device, the network providers, the M2M operators,
the POCT application providers, and the POCT vendors (OEMs).
The key M2M requirements for successful POCT system deployment
have been reviewed. POCT M2M security is a complex issue that






A brief introduction for the P-Cloud was provided in Chapter-2,
section 2.4. This chapter attempts to explain more details that are
not covered in section 2.4. In addition, a practical realization of the
P-Cloud is shown with the help of NAS (Network Attached Storage).
The connection to P-Cloud can be configured three ways as shown
in Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.
Figure 5.1: Accessing P-Cloud via G-Node
In Figure 5.1, G-Node plays a role in forwarding the POCT data
from P-Node. In this configuration, P-Node is capable of connecting
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to G-Node using non-cellular connectivity such as Bluetooth or WiFi
or similar radio access technologies. The configuration leverages the
security mechanisms provided by the G-Node for transmitting data
to P-Cloud.
Figure 5.2: Accessing P-Cloud via P-Node
In Figure 5.2, P-Node has direct connectivity to P-Cloud. In this
scenario, P-Node may have a user interface which can be used for ini-
tiating an assay. Then the data is collected, and it is sent to P-Cloud
directly. Providing a secure communication link is overhead in this
configuration because the security provided by the G-Node wireless
infrastructure is not utilized. If the G-Node is a Blackberry device,
it would be advisable to leverage the security support infrastructure,
Blackberry Enterprise Software(BES) used by the G-Node. There
are alternatives configurations such as Mobile Device Management
(MDM) solutions can be used in place of the BES. Multiple imple-
mentations of the MDM are available from mobile OEM vendors
such as Apple and Samsung.
Figure 5.3 shows a hybrid configuration. Both G-Node and P-Node
are capable of sending the data to P-Cloud. For instance, G-Node
can start the testing process and moves away from P-Node, which
forces P-Node to send the test data to P-Cloud. It is possible to
implement an appropriate response to a scenario in P-Node . If the
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Figure 5.3: Hybrid configuration model
connectivity between P-Node and G-Node was lost for a predeter-
mined time, then P-Node can be instructed to send the data directly
to P-Cloud. How long the P-Node can tolerate the loss of connectiv-
ity to G-Node can be predetermined. Thus the hybrid configuration
model provides some flexibility in which the operations can be car-
ried out.
There are no hard and fast rules that which entity needs to be con-
nected to the P-Cloud. The P-Cloud is capable of providing cellular,
or non-cellular (BT, WiFi, or similar access technologies) links to
the G-Node or the P-Node. It is entirely up to the deployment cost-
effectiveness to select a configuration for the usage.
As explained in Chapter-2, P-Cloud has five independent databases
conceptually (Figure 5.4). The smartphone application developers
will create applications which will provide access to the gateway
entities in the P-Cloud. The P-Cloud is conceptualized to meet
the HIPAA [28] privacy compliance requirements. In P-Cloud the
privacy compliance is designed by data segregation. Security groups
are employed to separate data boundaries. The P-Cloud consists
of four kinds of architectural artefacts as shown in Table 5.1. The
Table shows the purpose of each element in the system.
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Figure 5.4: Five types of P-Cloud Databases (with direct connection from P-Node)
There will be four types of human users: Patient, Engineers (Field
and Systems), Provisioning agencies and Physicians, who interact
with P-Cloud. Their access will be managed via security groups
(please refer Table 2-3, Chapter 2 for details).
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Table 5.1: Architecture Artefacts
Figure 5.5: Four types of human users
5.2 Configuration database
A configuration database (Figure 5.6) is a place for storing POCT
devices provisioning data. The configuration database will be acces-
sible to all the provisioned POCT devices (M2M link). Also, the
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Figure 5.6: Configuration database segment - (part of P-Cloud, Fig 5.4)
configuration database is available to various health care providers
and lab associates. The provisioned parameters will be pushed to
the devices from P-Cloud, using suitable device management tech-
nologies such as OMA DM (Open Mobile Alliance OMA, Device
Management-DM) standard processes.
5.3 Measurement database
Figure 5.7: Measurement database segment - (part of P-Cloud, Fig 5.4)
The measurement database (Figure 5.7) will have the data collected
during testing, and it will only be accessible to active and authorized
POCT devices in the system. The devices use M2M link to connect
to the gateway and the gateway forward the data to measurement
database of P-Cloud.
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5.4 Data mining (Analytics) database
Figure 5.8: Analytics database segment - (part of P-Cloud, Fig 5.4)
The purpose of the data mining database (Figure 5.8) is to provide
a platform for clinicians to analyze patient data. The data mining
database is an aggregated version of the measurement database. The
data mining database will be accessible to data mining application
developers (for interfacing data reporting and analytic tools) to pro-
vide a suitable information portal for the clinicians. The clinicians
will access data mining portion of P-Cloud via the data mining portal
access gateway.
5.5 Execution (operational) database
Figure 5.9: Execution database segment - (part of P-Cloud, Fig 5.4)
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As shown in Figure 5.9, the execution database will collect system
operational data. The operational database will help to debug field
issues, and it will enable to log critical system execution paths in
the provisioned POCT devices in the system. Field engineers and
P-Node are the primary users of the execution database. The oper-
ational data gateway provides access to the execution portion of the
database. The concept here is that the logged data will aid to iden-
tify any computational deviation for a particular POCT process. It
is essential that all the processes and their execution sequences in the
device should be clearly documented with assigned labels. P-Node
is designed to initiate a particular process, or a set of processes that
will provide measurement data pertains to a diagnostic test. There
will be a set of documented system execution paths in the design
that will accomplish the result. A diagnostic test will not be valid
if the documented execution paths differ during testing. The exe-
cution path data which will be logged in the database will reveal
any execution deviations against the standard system execution for
a given test. This process will not only help to remove any errors in
software coding during system acceptance testing (before launching
the system) but will also be an essential tool for field engineering
team to understand any device related issues. By analyzing the exe-
cution data logs, the field engineering team will be able to pinpoint
any cause of any issues during actual operation of the system. This
process will help to resolve device software issues in a timely manner.
The execution log database will be accessible to the field team and
the devices in the system.
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Figure 5.10: Deployment database segment - (part of P-Cloud, Fig 5.4)
5.6 Deployment database
As shown in Figure 5.10, the deployment database will have the in-
formation about the association of the devices and the G-Nodes that
can access the devices in the system. There are multiple deployment
scenarios are possible with POCT system. All the tested deployment
configurations will be available from the deployment database. It is
possible that the association between the POCT device and the G-
Node can be one to one association or one to many associations (i.e.
one POCT device and many kinds of G-Nodes such as smartphones,
PC and any user computing devices). The configuration database
will only have the configuration that pertains to the devices in the
system, and the deployment database will only have the association
data. The principle here is to segregate the data boundaries in dif-
ferent databases and hence avoid any software defects (bugs) and
execution errors.
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5.7 NAS implementation of private cloud
Network-attached storage (NAS)[127], is a file-level computer data
storage server connected to a computer network providing data ac-
cess to a heterogeneous group of clients. NAS is specialized for serv-
ing files either by its hardware, software, or configuration. The NAS
can be accessed via services provided by the NAS vendor. POCT
Site (indicated in Figure 5.11) access is provided via wired or wireless
connection between the device and the NAS. If a public cloud is avail-
able, then the NAS (Private Cloud) can be synchronized with the
public cloud, based on data sharing policies accepted at the POCT
site organization.
5.7.1 Need for Private Cloud
By definition of NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology)[128],
Private Cloud is defined as a bank cloud resource controlled by an
organization and used only by that organization. Public Cloud is de-
fined as cloud resources managed by a service provider who is based
in a data centre and shared by other customers. There are also other
types of deployment of cloud models, community cloud: provided
for a certain community and provisioned to meet those communities
needs, public cloud, which is provisioned for open use by general pub-
lic, and hybrid cloud, which is a combination of two or more types of
cloud models. The objections to using the public cloud services are,
they have inadequate SLA (service level agreements) for PoC type
of applications, they are less secure than private cloud deployments.
Also complying with regulatory requirements with public clouds can
be very challenging[128].
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On the other hand, the public cloud is catered for a multi-tenant en-
vironment, whereas the private cloud is used for a single tenant (or
community) environment. The private cloud provides high security
because this type of cloud is dedicated to the single organization.
Compliance with medical directives such as HIPAA compliance is
impossible with the public cloud hosting. The private cloud deploy-
ments are customizable. Any hybrid requirements such as running
some of the servers at a higher speed than other servers is possible
with private clouds because there is only one organization decides
the private cloud deployment strategies [129].
5.7.2 NAS Configuration
NAS configured as a private P-Cloud is shown in Figure 5.11. The
NAS differs from a standard file server in term of providing services
with those that are not available normally on a server. The NAS
was purchased from SYNOLOGY [130], a popular manufacturer of
NAS technology. The NAS will satisfy the data security and privacy
requirements needed for storing POCT data.
As shown in Figure 5.11, there are two sections to the private cloud
configuration, POCT Site and Public-site. These two sites are sepa-
rated by a firewall configured at the boundary of both sites.
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Figure 5.11: Architecture of NAS as Private Cloud
There are a few data connectivity paths (Table 5.2) possible with
this architecture model.
Table 5.2: Connectivity paths
The actual topology used during the experimentation is shown in
Chapter 5 150
Figure 5.12. A laptop was used as G-Node. USB is used as a con-
nection between the P-Node and the G-Node.
Figure 5.12: Physical topology for interconnecting NAS, G-Node, and P-Node
5.7.3 Validation Methodology
The system model that has been configured to represent POCT sys-
tem consists of a POCT device, G-Node which can be a smartphone
or a PC, and P-Cloud which contains cloud data storage which is the
test data. As shown in Figure 5.12, the right side of the environment
was set up at the Brunel POCT Lab, where the data collection was
done using a set of assays. The Data output was captured at the
G-Node (a laptop). The G-Node shown in Figure 5.12 was a laptop.
The G-Node was connected to the device via USB.
An example sample data collected is shown in Table 5-3. This is
an actual test data obtained from an experiment conducted in the
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Table 5.3: Sample Data from POCT device [1]
Doclab, Brunel University. The experiment was related to DNA
sequencing using fluorescein dyes: ROX, FAM and HEX [131]. Ba-
sically, HEX, ROX and FAM are the fluorescein levels for the LED
readings recorded by the POCT device used. T16 desktop Axxin
model was used as POCT device. The Axxin device was used as
a gold standard. The performance of the assay on the Axxin de-
vice was being monitored. For the data derived from the Axxin, the
only values that are considered is each tube value for FAM. Rox and
Hex are discarded as fluorescein dyes were not in use in the assay.
Results obtained for this dyes were default measurement from the
device itself. The assay used contained a dye (Eva Green) labelled
with FAM. The Axxin was the standard device used to run the assays
and then these results were compared with the Felix platform, which
was prototyped POCT device by Brunel. In the Figure 5.13, the
x-axis represents the time and the y-axis representing the measure-
ment value of the LED light through the dyes. In an actual POCT
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measurement, such techniques are used in DNA detection. The plot
shows the data collected from the device. In a practical measure-
ment scenario, the collected data will be interpreted by physicians
and healthcare experts for diagnosing the medical condition.
Figure 5.13: Test Data to be stored in the NAS
There are many ways to bring the data into the NAS. An easy way
to access data from the G-Node is to create shared folders both in
the G-Node and P-Node and create a soft-link between them. The
data collected is linked to the NAS using a soft link creation process
as described Figure 5.14. Once the data is copied into the NAS, the
data in G-Node was purged for security and privacy compliance.
Figure 5.14: Accessing data from P-Node
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By the process of port forwarding configuration (Figure 5.15) at the
edge router, the NAS data can be viewed securely beyond the firewall
boundaries, using a standard https link that is created before.
Figure 5.15: Port forwarding setup at the router
5.7.4 DDDNS SERVICE
Dynamic Domain Name Service (DDDNS) is used to connect the
NAS via the Internet. The DDDNS helps connecting the NAS to
the Internet by assigning a name to IP address of the NAS [130].
The name (Host Name), Brunel-doc-lab was created (Figure 5.16).
5.7.5 Access POCT site from Internet (WAN side access)
The port forwarding process will provide NAS accessibility via the
https://Brunel-doc-lab.sinology.me (Figure 5.17). This is how
the P-Cloud is accessible outside of the firewall. The NAS vendor
allows having the DNS service configured as defined by the user.
Chapter 5 154
Figure 5.16: Creation of Brunel-doc-lab.sinology.me
Figure 5.17: Login screen for accessing NAS outside of the POCT site via DDDNS
The user needs to provide the user-id and the password configured
to access the POCT data.
5.7.6 Access POCT site via an internal IP address? (LAN side access)
The local LAN address can be used to access the NAS within the
POCT site (Figure 5.18). This is how the data can be accessed
using the 192.168.1.155 (local LAN IP-address) within the firewall
boundaries.
Note that the external (WAN side) and the internal (LAN side) user
interface (login screen) is the same look alike.
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Figure 5.18: Login screen for accessing NAS using LAN address
Figures 5.19-21 shows the NAS hardware (Synology manufacturer)
used in the experimentation. The hard disk is purchased separately.
Usually, a typical NAS hardware can support two standard hard
disks.
Figure 5.19: One BAY was used for the experimentation
5.7.7 Connectivity between G-Node and NAS
The connection between the device and the P-Cloud (NAS) can be
wired LAN or wireless. For the experimentation, the NAS access is
provided via Ethernet (wired LAN) link (Figure 5.22).
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Figure 5.20: Multiple Bays system
Figure 5.21: Synology NAS
Figure 5.22: USB connection between NAS and G-Node
5.7.8 Strategies for data transfer from POCT sites
There are many ways the data can be shared among the user of the
system. The POCT data can be uploaded to an SD card. Then the
SD card needs to be encrypted. The encrypted data then can be
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transmitted as a file to the NAS. It is possible to update the NAS
directly as shown in Figure 5.14, by creating a soft link connection.
If the P-Cloud is available only via the G-Node, then an application
on the G-Node (Smartphone or PC) can upload the data to the P-
Cloud.
The data sharing outside of the POCT site can be accomplished
by imposing firewall policies. This will ensure that only required
metadata is shared with a 3rd party or public cloud.
5.7.9 NAS QoS (Quality Of Service)
There are two main ways in which QoS can be configured for the
NAS Disk Stations. They are called Traffic Control and Speed Lim-
its [132]. NAS provides dedicated QoS management tools to sup-
port desired BW. The traffic control helps to ensure a predetermined
bandwidth for the users. The speed limit process helps to control
bandwidth usage by P-Cloud groups.
5.7.9.1 Traffic control process in NAS
Disk Station Manager (DSM) provides all the required parameters
for managing QoS. DSM is provided by the NAS vendor. Traffic
control tab of the DSM is shown in Figure 5.23. Traffic control
aims to manage the outgoing traffic of services running on the NAS.
Multiple rules can be created to set the guaranteed and maximum
bandwidth of specific ports. The ports provide certain services to
the users.
The Figure 5.23 shows the user interface for the application based
BW configuration. A guaranteed value and a maximum value of the
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Figure 5.23: Control Panel Firewall and QoS
BW can be assigned. The application based BW assignment helps to
manage the POCT applications in the system effectively. The NAS
administrator can differentiate the QoS based on the protocols used
by the POCT applications.
A maximum and guaranteed BW (Kb /s) can be configured per
application (e.g. MySQL DB).
A typical BW value can be in the order of a data rate for Narrow
Band IoT (NB-IoT) devices. Usually, it is in the order of 20 Kb
/ s in the case of single tone system and 250 Kb /s in the case of
multi-tone system[133][134].
QoS can be configured based on a specific protocol and specific
port(s) or ports range as shown in Figure 5.24. The figure shows
the user interface for configuring BW based on the port numbers.
The port number based BW control is another process of managing
the POCT applications. The port numbers based BW management
provides more granularity to assign BW for the POCT applications.
Figure 5.25 shows some of the lists of protocols with the port num-
bers.
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Figure 5.24: Specific port traffic with guaranteed and maximum bandwidth
Figure 5.25: Built-in applications
Traffic control rules can be created for the individual applications.
A list of built-in applications is shown in Figure 5.24. The outgoing
traffic from the NAS will be throttled to meet the conditions set
by the rules per application. There will be an overhead due to the
processing of the rules which is negligible with use of higher grade
network processors. The definitions of these parameters used in the
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rules are defined as follows [135, 136].
5.7.9.2 Guaranteed Bandwidth
This parameter defines the outgoing traffic service, and it guarantees
to serve when the whole system bandwidth is wide enough.
5.7.9.3 Maximum Bandwidth (BW)
Maximum BW defines the outgoing traffic. This service can be trig-
gered when the entire system bandwidth is sufficient, and there is
still system BW remaining.
The algorithm used in the NAS calculates System Output Bandwidth
first and then make sure the sum of Guaranteed Bandwidth for each
service is not greater than System Output Bandwidth.
Figure 5.26: BW equation
In summary, the traffic control is managed by creating traffic rules
via the NAS control panel.
5.7.9.4 Speed limits process in NAS
One of the limitations of Traffic Control is the rules are only applied
to individual ports or services. The users also need a fine-grained
QoS control on user-level when they transfer files over the Internet
[130].
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As shown in Figure 5.27, the user groups configured (Name): admin,
anonymous, guest and ruth. These users can configure up-link and
downlink speeds. This mechanism will provide more granular control
of traffic in addition to the port based bandwidth control.
Figure 5.27: Speed limit process
5.8 Conclusion
P-Cloud implementation as a private cloud, using NAS technology
is discussed in the chapter. The security group concepts can be
implemented in a NAS platform or a commercially available cloud
platforms, by applying system provided privilege mechanisms at data
folders or data segment levels. The privilege mechanisms can be used
as a way of implementing QoS. But the more advanced process of
ensuring QoS is necessary as explained in the chapter. There are two
mechanisms: traffic control and speed control are used to provide ser-
vice level QoS and user-level QoS. The five types of databases within
the P-Cloud can be assigned to individual folders in the NAS. The
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folders can be assigned to security groups (or user groups) to pro-
vide independent bandwidth allocation and user group based traffic
control as needed. Realization of P-Cloud using the NAS is a cost-
effective way of experimenting new configurations in P-Cloud, which
is capable of providing functionalities that are expensive if they are
deployed using commercially available cloud vendors NAS solution
is scalable as the hard disks can be added as deployment needs grow.
The current QoS implementation of NAS by the vendor is linked to
WAN (Internet) traffic and LAN traffic. The NAS DSM provides
an application called, security adviser for accessing POCT data se-
curity. It scans for network connections, user and system configu-
rations, malware software and NAS software updates and highlights
any potential security risks. In addition, it can provide a report on
security rules configured and their validity. Appropriate action can
be taken based on the report [137]. If the FTP is used for transfer-
ring data from the testing device, it is possible to have 32 concurrent
connection sessions, depending on the NAS model[138].
Chapter 6
Network Models for POCT
system deployment
6.1 Introduction
The Point-of-Care Testing (POCT) system can be considered an AI-
based system or a Cloud-based computing system, depending on the
system boundaries. If the Public Cloud (P-Cloud) is configured as a
private cloud within firewall boundaries and all the computation is
done with G-Node and P-Node, then the system can be described as
an AI-based platform. The AI-based computing systems are inde-
pendent of public cloud-based computing, standalone systems with
interfaces capable of connecting to public clouds. The cloud-based
computing systems use the cloud services for most of the comput-
ing activities. This chapter presents network models that can be
used to deploy POCT systems. These network models apply to both
the AI and the Cloud-based platforms. The network models pro-
vide connectivity configurations for the POCT usage scenarios. The
network model also provides a process for deploying such practical
systems. It is a typical application in M2M / domain topics. The
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IoT deployment techniques can be used in deploying the POCT sys-
tems as well. In the M2M system deployment network infrastructure
plays a critical role [139]. It is necessary to provide a good user ex-
perience by having appropriate IoT application-sensitive networks
[140]. This is a mission-critical application because it deals with a
medical diagnosis related to the wellness of humans. It is vital that
the network architecture be interoperable at all levels because of the
mission criticality of the application [141]. Interoperability is one
of the key parameters for successful system operation. The POCT
operation demands the offloading of computing powers to the cloud
and servers [142]. This chapter explains the goal of making sure
that the resources and computing power are shared. Black routing
and node obscuring are phenomena with IoT type of networks. It
is stated that token-based routing is one of the ways to mitigate
packet delays due to black routing [143]. In section 6.4, a simi-
lar approach is discussed using a Multiple Protocol Label Switching
(MPLS) routing scheme, and it shows the use of MPLS for con-
necting networking entities within the POCT system. Section 6.2
provides the basic building blocks of the POCT system. Section 6.3
shows the use cases of connectivity for the POCT network nodes.
Managing Quality Of Service ( QoS) is complex in the IoT type
of network, a condition that requires special considerations [144]. In
section 6.4, a network topology is presented that will resolve the QoS
related challenges in the POCT network deployments. In addition,
section 6.4 discusses ways of classifying the connectivity models to
simplify the deployment complexities and process of deploying prac-
tical systems. Section 6.5 shows a parallel ecosystem that is needed
for development and maintenance of the POCT system. Section 6.6
shows several scenarios where usage of commercially available cloud
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services and other means for establishing communication paths for
POCT systems. Section 6.7 discusses a naval process of managing
congestions, called collaborative congestion management.
Figure 6.1: Fundamental connectivity Building blocks
(This figure is the same as figure 3.3, but repeated here to aid the
reader)
6.2 Basic connectivity model
The connectivity links between the nodes can be cellular communica-
tion links or short-range type communication links, depending on the
user scenarios. The following sections outline important user scenar-
ios concerning wireless connectivity. The P-Node and the G-Node
can have both cellular and short-range wireless access technologies
integrated into a single module. For discussion purposes, it is as-
sumed the cellular and the technologies like Wi-Fi are enabled in
both the P and G Nodes. For the purpose of creating user scenar-
ios, a system consists of multiple basic building blocks; sections 6.3.1
6.3.7 considers them. The seven P-Node and G-Node configuration
scenarios are discussed.
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Figure 6.2: Multiple ways to connect P-Cloud
6.3 Possibilities for connectivity
Figure 6.2 shows the multiple ways of establishing communication
links between the fundamental architectural entities. In the dia-
gram, an internal server is shown within the local location network
boundary.
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The P-Node and the G-Node are linked via USB or any short-range
radio access technologies such as BT or Wi-Fi. The P-Cloud is shown
as outside entity of the local network domain. Note that an internal
server is a form of internal private cloud that is described in detail in
this chapter. The data from the internal server can be shared with
P-Cloud via an Internet gateway interface.
The green lines show that the G-Node can be connected directly to
the P-Cloud, based on the configuration. The green link is proba-
bly a cellular connection (2G, 3G or 4G). Also, the G-Node can be
connected (red lines) to the internal server using radio access tech-
nologies such as Wi-Fi. The violet lines indicate the connectivity
links between the P-Node and the P-Cloud. The violet link is the
same kind (mostly cellular connections) as the green link. The blue
links indicate short-range radio access between the P-Node and the
local server.
All the connectivity links can be operated in parallel. But at least
one link must be active in order to transmit measured data from any
POCT device. In a practical deployment, all the links may not be
activated. The number of links needed will depend on the capacity
of the network providers and the Service Level Agreements (SLA)
policies that are in place.
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Figure 6.3: Data send to local server
6.3.1 Direct connectivity between local server and both P-Node and
G-Node
The local server within the local network domain shown in Figure
6.3 is a private cloud. The local data must be transmitted to the P-
Cloud for sharing the test data for diagnosis with other institutions.
Appropriate server data export (share) policies can be deployed to
control data flow. The main advantage of having the local server
is to provide data privacy for the patients. All the links shown in
the diagram (red and blue links) are mainly short-range connectivity
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Figure 6.4: Data send to local server
radio technologies such as Wi-Fi and ZigBee. This configuration is
most useful in a hospital environment where the diagnosis is possible
using the local data server.
6.3.2 Direct connectivity between local server and P and G Nodes
In this configuration, the G-Node can play a role as a secure data
gateway that transmits test data from the P-Node as shown in Figure
6.4. In this configuration, the communication functionality of the
G-Node is reused, which eliminates the need for developing wireless
Chapter 6 170
Figure 6.5: P-Node as data gateway
capability within the P-Node. P-Node and G-Node can be linked
via USB interface or BT interface. The links between G-Node and
the local server would be short-range radio access technologies such
as Wi-Fi or ZigBee. This configuration is useful for low-cost rural
operations. The security is leveraged based on the Wi-Fi network
availability, which will include a standard secure Wi-Fi deployment.
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6.3.3 Standalone model
The standalone configuration is defined based on the mode of oper-
ation of the P-Node. As shown in Figure 6.5, the P-Node has two
main roles, data gateway for communication and testing control for
execution of relevant assays. The P-Node needs to have the commu-
nication modules in addition to the control modules. The role of the
G-Node is to initiate the testing process in P-Node. It is also possi-
ble that P-Node can be operated with its own user interface, such as
a touchscreen. The radio access technologies would be short-range
wireless connectivity such as Wi-Fi. The P-Node is this configura-
tion can be considered a benchtop mode of operation if it is used
without a G-Node.
6.3.4 Alternate Hybrid model
In the alternate hybrid model, the G-Node and the P-Node are con-
figured to transmit test data to the server. This configuration is
named the alternative hybrid model because G-Node and P-Node are
used alternatively to provide wireless connectivity. The use case for
the configuration is to balance the communication pathways (shown
in red and blue in Figure 6.6) within the system. With this type of
configurations, P-Nodes with both wireless access and non-wireless
access can be deployed. The blue links can be set as Wi-Fi, and the
red links can be set as Bluetooth, or even different channels within
the Wi-Fi, depending on the availability and loading of the channels.
The allocation of the access technologies needs to be selected on a
case-by-case basis.
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Figure 6.6: Hybrid data gateways (Load balancing model)
6.3.5 Standalone Hybrid model
In the standard hybrid model, the data path is shared between the
G-Node and P-Node. The use case for the standard hybrid configu-
ration is for managing the availability of access technologies at the
location where the system is deployed. Either the two scenarios use
the access technology spectrum heavily and cause interference, or
the spectrum (bands) is not adequate to meet all the demands of
the network users. The standard hybrid configuration provides data
collection assurance in both scenarios.
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Figure 6.7: G-Node as gateways and P-Node as gateways
6.3.6 Use of well-known secure enterprise server infrastructures
In all the configurations, the POC test data need to be sent to the
local server or the P-Cloud securely. Using any well tested secure in-
frastructure is a smart strategy to send the data securely. Figure 6,8
shows the well-known secure connectivity model Blackberry Enter-
prise Server (BES) (cites as an example) available for transmitting
secure data. It is assumed that the G-Nodes have access to the BES
infrastructure via carrier subscription. The BES secure connection
is made via the cellular links provided by the carriers. This is shown
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Figure 6.8: BIS (Blackberry server for connecting to P-Cloud)
in the green links. The G-Nodes are connected to the internal server
as well, shown as red dotted lines in the diagram. Because it uses
an industry-tested secure BES infrastructure, the POCT system can
depend on the BES for secure data transmission.
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Figure 6.9: Using secure smartphone as G-Node
6.3.7 Using secure smartphone device as G-Node with secure enter-
prise server infrastructure
If all the G-Nodes do not have the secure BES access, it is possible
that the G-Nodes that have access can play a role as rendezvous
nodes (shown as G-Node-S) to provide secure transmission paths
for other G-Nodes that do not have access to the BES. Figure 6.9
shows only two of the G-Nodes can connect to the BES. The two
BES enabled G-Nodes are connected to the P-Cloud via the BES
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services (as shown in Figure 6.9 with green lines). The selection of
the configurations depends on the individual situations and available
deployment budget.
6.4 Definition of the POCT system and communities
Figure 6.10: POCT Communities: Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3
A deployment strategy for the POCT system is needed to maintain
the quality of service (QoS) or service level agreements for POCT de-
vice users. The following section explains a method of accomplishing
QoS in POCT-based interconnected systems.
In Figure 6.10, the concept of POCT communities is depicted. The
POCT community type-1 consists of separate P-Node and G-Node
Chapter 6 177
units. The QoS depends on the capabilities of the P-Node or G-Node.
In the type-2 community, the P-Node — G-node pair is linked to a
local server. The QoS for the type-2 community can be defined at the
server level. The type-2 community is meant for using the system
within local boundaries of a hospital or a patient testing centre.
The type-3 community is meant to serve locally and also extend
the data transmission to an external cloud via secure infrastructure.
The QoS for the type-3 communities can be defined at the secure
infrastructure level and the local server level. Having the three types
of POCT communities helps to define Service Level Agreements from
the service providers, thus providing guaranteed and desired QoS.
6.4.1 Connecting POCT communities and P-Cloud
Figure 6.11 shows three types of POCT communities or systems
that are connected to a central P-Cloud. The QoS levels for the
connectivity can be set based on the type of system that is connected
to the P-Cloud. The idea of having the classification helps to assign
QoS parameters individually.
6.4.2 Realising POCT System
In this section, the idea of building the POCT system is explained.
The POCT System is presented as a hierarchical model. The hi-
erarchical approach helps to define access permissions. By having
hierarchical boundary policies, the data flow between various levels
can be controlled. There are four independent regions of control
shown in Figure 6.12, POCT system, POCT zone, POCT site and
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Figure 6.11: Connecting to P-Cloud with multiple types of POCT systems
POCT units. The POCT-System is made up of multiple POCT-
Zones. The POCT-Zones are deployed with multiple POCT-Sites.
The POCT-Site is a collection of multiple POCT-Units.
6.4.3 POCT Units
The POCT unit can have two kinds of configurations, (G-Node and
P-Node) and (standalone P-Node), as shown in Figure 6.13. The ad-
vantage of the G-Node and P-Node configuration is that the security
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Figure 6.12: POCT System Hierarchy
requirements can be met by the G-Node alone (or leveraged by the G-
Node) and the P-Node can be designed for the POCT testing, using
the security mechanisms provided by the G-Node. The G-Node and
P-Node pair configuration provides a cost-effective solution because
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Figure 6.13: Definition of POCT unit
the patient can leverage the existing data communication function-
ality from the G-Node.
On the other hand, the standalone P-Node configurations provide
user with a display and keypad interface to conduct POC testing.
After the completion of the testing the P-Node data needs to be sent
over to P-Cloud for diagnostics analysis. The standalone configura-
tion is useful during communication outages.
6.4.4 POCT Site
Figure 6.14: Definition of POCT site
A POCT site is constructed with multiple POCT units and a server
as a site controller. The site controller includes data storage. A
POCT site is an example of a testing location in a hospital. The
communication links within the site normally are deployed using a
short-range connectivity radio access technology such as Wi-Fi.
The number of POCT Units in a POCT Site is determined by the
capability of the site controller. The performance parameters are to
be looked at based on the site needs.
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6.4.5 POCT Zone
Figure 6.15: Definition of POCT Zone
The construct of zone architecture helps to connect multiple sites.
The zone will have a server, called the zone controller. This zone
controller links multiple site controllers via cellular radio access tech-
nology. In Figure 6.15, the zone is shown as a cellular site. But there
are many configurations possible with available network operators.
Since mobility is not part of the POCT zone, the usual challenges
such as handover from a cellular RAT to another cellular RAT are not
applicable. Certain cellular bands are allocated by the network op-
erators for the kind of operations that are expected from the POCT
zone scenarios. The communication between POCT zones to POCT
sites can be viewed as extensions of the IoT.
The zone and site controllers normally are developed by the OEMs or
module vendors, such as Telit or Foxconn. The process of deploying
carrier (operators) compliance equipment is lengthy and complex.
.It starts with the modem vendors, such as Intel or Qualcomm, who
get involved in the chip level certification with the network oper-
ators, such as ATT (other well-known network operators: Orange,
T-Mobile, Verizon, Telstra, Sprint, China Mobile). The module ven-
dors (e.g. Telit, Sierra Wireless, u-blox) conduct the device or zone
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controller level certification with the operators. The modem and the
server module need to be certified by the network operators.
6.4.6 POCT System
Figure 6.16: Definition of POCT System
The POCT system consists of multiple POCT zones. The number
of POCT zones in a POCT system, in other words, the capacity
of the POCT system, depends on the capabilities of the individual
components. It is not possible to predict a value for the capacity of
POCT zones.
Figure 6.16 shows multiple POCT zones within a POCT system as
an example. Having the hierarchical system development approach
helps to determine the capacity of the system as an aggregated
value. The hierarchical architectural view differs from traditional ap-
proaches that exist currently. In the hierarchical architecture, each
level in the system works independently, coexisting as part of the
complete system, based on the need. A POCT system can have sev-
eral units or a single unit. There is no need to deploy the complete
system at the beginning, as the system can be expanded as demand
increases, based on the needs of the community or users.
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6.4.7 Capacity of POCT System - Honeycomb compatible communi-
cation links
In a complete system, there are multiple POCT zones that need to be
linked. The following section provides a deployment planning rules
process by which the multiple zones can be linked. The POCT zone
is depicted as a hexagon with six faces. Each face represents the
communication interfaces available in a POCT zone. The length of
the face represents the capacity of the communication link. Since the
lengths of the hexogen arms are equal, the hexogen model represents
a POCT zone that has capacity or bandwidth for six equal links. A
process of building the connectivity follows.
Figure 6.17: A complete POCT System (Capacity Model)
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The centre POCT zone has six ways of connecting to other peripheral
POCT zones. The six connections can be combinations of cellular
wireless links and Wi-Fi type links or one kind of communication
link. The six communication linkages imply that there are six other
POCT zones compatible with communication links provided by the
centre POCT zone. It is possible that the peripheral POCT (POCT-
Zone-1) zones will then connect with two other neighbouring periph-
eral POCT zones (PoCT-Zone-2 and POCT-Zone-6), in addition to
connecting with the centre POCT zone. Thus, a complete system
will have seven POCT zones, as shown in Figure 6.17. This process
can be used to plan both the POCT-Zones and the POCT-Sites.
6.4.8 Multiple POCT Systems
Figure 6.18 shows expanded systems with multiple POCT systems.
This figure also shows the number of active POCT zones. The POCT
systems map reveals the availability of the POCT-Zones at an ab-
stracted level for all the parties involved in deploying the system.
The model shown in Figure 6.18 will provide many benefits: the de-
cision to deploy equipment from same vendors or different vendors,
system capacity study of individual POCT systems, interoperable
experiments with multiple vendors, and deployment cost analysis.
6.4.9 Interconnecting Multiple POCT sites to a P-Cloud
In this section, an approach for interconnecting the POCT sites is
explained. Multiple Protocol Label Switch (MPLS) is a protocol
that uses existing layer -3 routing protocols, and it is placed between
layer-3 and layer-2 in the 7-layer networking model. It is also called
layer-2.5 protocol technology.
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Figure 6.18: Multiple POCT systems map
The MPLS is known for multi-vendor systems interconnections in
providing faster network connectivity. One of the characteristics
of the MPLS is that the number of hops in the network path is
less, compared to standard layer-3 connectivity. As shown in Figure
6.19, it will take Router-1, Router-2, and Router-3 to transmit from
POCT-Site-1 to POCT-Site-3, which will be three hop counts. But
with MPLS, virtually the POCT sites situate them next to each
other with respect to the network hop count. The fewer hop counts
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Figure 6.19: MPLS based interconnection of POCT sites
will translate into less delay between the site communications.
The routers are assumed to be MPLS enabled devices (i.e., they have
MPLS stack in addition to standard TCP / IP protocol stack). With
the MPLS enabled, the reachability of the P-Cloud from the POCT
sites is one hop.
6.5 Development and maintenance strategy for POCT sys-
tem
Ongoing development and maintenance are planned to support the
installations of the POCT systems. An ecosystem that provides the
development and maintenance needs is important to the success of
the deployed POCT system operations. Figure 6.20 shows the re-
quired ecosystems needed to support the development and mainte-
nance activities after the initial deployment of the POCT sites. The
activities include network operator compliance certifications, imple-
mentation of new standard rules, upgrading of system components,
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Figure 6.20: Development and system maintenance ecosystem
POCT applications development and the introduction of new devices
to meet new requirements. Failure to have a supportive ecosystem
will impact POCT system operations.
6.5.1 Interconnecting development sites
As mentioned in section 6.4.8, development and maintenance sites
can be interconnected via the MPLS connectivity (as shown in Figure
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6.19).
6.5.2 Business units needed for POCT development ecosystem
Figure 6.21: POCT organization for Business
For business development, testing, and selling the POCT systems,
there are few business organizations needed. These business units are
shown in Figure 6.21. It starts from the requirement management
(system specification), SW / HW development, Validation and Veri-
fication (V and V), System Integration Testing (SIT), Manufacturing
(MFG), Field testing, Customer care, and Marketing business units.
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Also, simulation and modelling, along with test case generation and
management, are required to run a successful POCT business.
The requirement system is a database of all the specifications of the
developed system, and it is the main driver of any system develop-
ment activities. The requirement management is usually a part of the
system engineering discipline. One of the activities of requirement
management is to understand the technical specification requested
by various stakeholders of the POCT system, identify any functional
gaps and plan development effort to close the gaps. The software
version control system maintains all versions of the system deployed
and in development. The versions history will reveal functionalities
in the working system. This is an important system when dealing
with maintenance system releases and in maintaining high-quality
systems. Customer interface is an operational business unit where
the daily customer interactions are handled. V-and-V is verification
and validation unit where the test cases are developed and traced to
the system requirements. This is a critical business unit that helps
to contain any critical system issues before the product is released.
The V-and-V unit plays a role as the main gatekeeper before the
system is deployed, with the test case generation unit a part of it.
But sometimes it is an independent system modeling unit that de-
velops test scenarios to cover maximum functional coverage (usually
99 percentage of the functionalities), using modelling and simulation
methodologies such as combinatorial design techniques.
The marketing business unit researches the future system needs and
conducts competitive studies to provide market analysis data for
the systems engineering business unit. The manufacturing organiza-
tion works in collaboration with the development team and produces
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POCT devices for the planned deployments. In some cases, the man-
ufacturing is done by a third party organization. The field testing
unit is an absolute necessity for understanding the deployment en-
vironments, and the field team helps fix any issues that may surface
after deployments.
Note that all the business organizations will use the shared resources
from the sites and the zones. The site/zone resources include the clin-
ical research community who provide their expertise in the POCT
system component development. A dedicated development ecosys-
tem must exist for sustaining the POCT systems deployments.
6.6 Connecting commercially available Cloud services with
POCT
The purpose of this section is to provide some interesting configu-
rations for realizing the POCT system using commercially available
system components.
6.6.1 With commercial Cloud
Figure 6.22 shows the use of commercially available cloud services
such as AWS (Amazon Cloud Services) and a Wi-Fi enabled router
connected to the POCT device, which is a very simple approach
to transmit test data from the POCT devices to the cloud. The
security of the system is accomplished by leveraging the standard
security provided by the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and cloud
service providers.
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Figure 6.22: Commercial Cloud and G-Node
6.6.2 With commercial Cloud and local private Cloud
Figure 6.23 shows a POCT device deployment configuration that
is created by the commercial cloud and Network Attached Storage
(NAS) as a private cloud for transmitting test data. Because of
the NAS, the user has the option to store the data locally as well.
Detailed information about the NAS is found in Chapter-5.
6.6.3 Useful configuration of G-Node for connecting to commercial
Clouds
The role of the G-Node is to provide a gateway to POCT data. As
shown in Figure 6.24, the G-Node is defined as a combination of a
wireless Access Point (AP) and a smartphone. There are two sets
of data pathways to transmit the test data to the P-Cloud, based
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Figure 6.23: Commercial cloud and NAS as private cloud
Figure 6.24: Commercial cloud and NAS as private cloud
on user preference. The security of the data depends on the Wi-Fi
access provided by the AP.
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6.7 Simulation of key network models
The common characteristics of the network topologies for the POCT
system can be stated as a combination of point-to-point (P2P) and
star configurations. The star configurations are considered as multi-
ple P2P connections. The NS3 simulation system is used to model
some of the scenarios[145]. The concepts associated with the NS3
are explained[146].
6.7.1 Simulation of Point-to-Point data traffic between P-Node and
G-Node
One way of managing the data traffic is to manage the buffer size at
the receiver. Buffer bloating [147] is known as a method of increasing
the buffer size of the queue to manage data reception. If the buffer is
increased to accommodate a queuing space to a maximum allowable
possible, the packet drop can be brought down to zero. But the QoS
may not be controllable in the state of maximum buffer size.
The simulation tool used was NS3. The NS3 has some basic ab-
straction concepts related to network simulation [148]. Node is a
basic protocol stack entity defined in the NS3. The P-Node and the
G-Node are the basics entities in the context of the POCT system.
An application runs on the nodes in the NS3 simulation framework.
The UDP packets or TCP packets represent the data that are trans-
mitted and received by the nodes. The POCT application runs over
the TCP / IP layer.
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The abstraction of the channel provides a means of connecting nodes
that are configured in multiple configurations. The purpose of sim-
ulating the basic entities in the POCT system, point to point con-
nection (Point-To-Point-Channel) is considered because regardless
of the number of P-Nodes, the data is sent to the G-Node via the
point-to-point connectivity.
The net device is an abstraction of software driver control which
connects the node to the selected channel. The P-Node and the G-
Node are modelled as the net devices (Point-To-Point-NetDevice),
using the point-to-point connection functionality. Also, the net de-
vice represents the layer-2 (data link layer) functionalities in TCP /
IP network model[149].
6.7.2 Simulation details
The network topology is simulated as a point-to-point (P2P) con-
nection between P-Node and G-Node. In a standard POCT system,
there will be multiple P2P connections. These connections can be
categorized as narrowband links (NB-IoT) [150], because of the na-
ture of the POCT system. There will be bursts of data traffic in the
links.
By changing the packet size throughput of the point-to-point, con-
nection is recorded. The traffic control layer is a concept in the NS3
in which the TC layer lies between the L2 and the protocol stack
[151]. The throughput is defined by the following formula.
throughput =
totalPacketsReceived ∗ 8
simulationT ime ∗ 1000000.0
Mbits/sec (6.1)
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Figure 6.25: Throughput plot
The traffic controllers role is to manage the internal packet queues
based on the number of packets received. Note that, as shown in Fig-
ure 6.25, at 200 bytes onwards, the throughput change is minimal.
The trend of minimal change in throughput goes up to 256 bytes
packets. Therefore, the desired operating region can be assumed
between 200 to 256 bytes. The number of bytes used in POCT
measurements can differ based on the assays and processes defined
by individual test measurements. There is another throughput in-
crement period starting from 600 bytes packet size. The number
of packets depends on type assays used. Some assays will produce
more data than others. Accordingly, the transmission of data can be
planned based on the throughput plot of the whole system.
Figure 6.26 and Figure 6.27 show the packet loss profile of the G-
Node (or the P2P link). Note that the packet size of 200 bytes is
the key knee point for getting the stable packet transfer. The knee
point is due to packet loss management characteristics of the TC
implementation of the NS3. The TC of the G-Node can be developed
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Figure 6.26: Packets sent to G-Node
Figure 6.27: Packet loss (percentage)
in such a way that the interface (i.e., the interface used by the P-
Node P2P connections) achieves the desired knee point reference
to the P-Node dataset as configured. Practical application of the
simulation is to apply padding so that the data packets can reach
the 200 bytes packet size which will provide a constant throughput
for a given P-Node.
6.8 Collaborative congestion control management
In the previous section, it was stated that the buffer manipulation
plays one of the key roles in managing data link performance. In
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this section, a new way of managing data congestion during trans-
mission is explained. The idea is to have sixteen bytes of data as
a base for transmitting measurement data by any active P-Node in
the system. In a POCT system, there will be multiple P-Nodes with
different assays for measurement. The P-Nodes will be configured
to handle a different kind of assay. Measurement data capacity re-
quired by each P-Node needs to be set per the requirement provided
by the clinician. Using the sixteen bytes as the baseline measure-
ment element and multiples of sixteen bytes will be allocated for the
P-Nodes, depending on the assays requirements.
Figure 6.28: Data and Control Channels
In Figure 6.28, the network setup for multiple P-Nodes connected
to the G-Node is shown. The connection between the G-Node and
each P-Node is governed by the point-to-point connectivity. Control
channels are shown in addition to the data channels. The control
channel is used to having collaborative congestion control among all
connected entities. The concept is to inform the P-Nodes regarding
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the availability of the data channels between the G-Node and the P-
Nodes. Figure 6.29 shows configuration matrix of the P-Node. The
configuration matrix control the communication rules of the P-Node.
Figure 6.29 is zoomed in version of configuration matrix of Figure
6.30.
Figure 6.29: P-Cloud configuration in detail (expanded version of Figure 6.30)
As shown in Figure 6.29, Byte Count field indicates the number
of bytes that can be configured. TxStpNode-1 field indicates the
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measurement capacity for P-Node-1. TxStpNode-2 field indicates
the measurement capacity for P-Node-2. The 1s are the bytes avail-
able for storing the measurement data. The 1s indicate enabled byte
positions. The 0s indicate the disabled byte positions. The 2s indi-
cate the byte positions used for transmission control. The 14th byte
is reserved for the transmission status indicator. There are 32 bytes
available in P-Node-2. The 14th and 30th bytes are reserved for
indicating transmission status (Transmit end indication data).
The transmission status indicators are marked as 2 in the diagram.
Similar logic is applied for configuring other higher capacity mea-
surement nodes.
The Figure 6.31 shows six P-Nodes and a G-Node in the network.
Note-1 indicates the configured data capacity for each P-Node. The
P-Node-1 is configured to collect test data of sixteen bytes, and the
other P-Nodes are configured as 32, 48, 64, 80, and 96 bytes shown in
the diagram. Note that the measurement capacity is set in multiples
of 16 bytes, as 16 bytes is the basic configuration. These configura-
tions are shown in the configuration matrix (Figure 6.29).
The use of the transmission status indicator is to inform the G-Node
of the two bytes before the end of the 16 bytes group transmission.
In the case of 16 bytes, G-Node will get an indication when the 14th
byte is transmitted. In the case of the 32 bytes node, G-Node will
get a transmission status indication of the 14th and the 30th bytes,
which is shown in Note-2 in Figure 6.31. Note-3 shows the status
byte transmission from the P-Node-6, which has the capacity of 96
bytes. Following the same process, the P-Node-6 will transmit the
status byte six times as shown in the Note-3. The G-Node will inform
the P-Nodes when it receives a transmission status byte from any P-
Nodes, as shown in Figure 6.31, Note-4 and Note-5. The information
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sent to the P-Nodes contains a control word as shown in Figure 6.32.
There are six 16 bytes spaces of data storage available in the P-Node-
6, which means that the application program can send a transmission
status indication six times (byte locations: 14, 30, 46, 62, 78 and 94)
to the G-Node. Also, the application can send a single transmission
status byte as shown in Figure 6.33.
Thus, the framework structure provides a flexible way of implement-
ing the transmission status byte. The transmission status byte is the
byte position at (N-2), where N = (16, 32, 48, 64, 80, 96 and so on).
In the beginning, the G-Node will create a subscribed nodes list
that indicates the type of P-Nodes attached to the G-Node. The
subscribed nodes list is formed by a control word or control vector
that informs the P-Node of the status of data transmissions from
each of the P-Nodes. In addition to sending the control word, G-
Node also recommends the channel capacity in terms of the number
of P-Nodes. Using these two basic parameters, the P-Nodes that
have completed the measurement process can collaborate in using the
available channel to transmit the data to the G-Node. The control
word will be sent periodically to all the subscribed P-Nodes. The
detailed algorithm is shown in Figure 6.34.
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Figure 6.30: P-Node configuration matrix
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Figure 6.31: Message sequence chat for collaborative communication
Figure 6.32: Control Status Word for P-Nodes
Figure 6.33: Sending single transmission indication byte
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Figure 6.34: Flow chart for congestion control
6.8.1 Congestion control algorithm
The algorithm for managing congestion control is shown in Figure
6.34. Note a: The P-Nodes are configured based on the assays re-
quirements. The master configuration matrix is shown in Figure 6.29
and Figure 6.30. The data capacity is allocated in chunks of 16 bytes.
Note b: The configuration matrix is shared with G-Node. Note c:
The P-Nodes register (or subscribe) for updates transmitted from
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G-Node. Note d: The G-Node waits for measurement data from the
P-Nodes. Notes e and f: When a data transmission indication byte
is received, the G-Node formulates the control word (an example
is shown in Figure 6.33 and transmits to the subscribed P-Nodes.
It is expected that all the active P-Nodes will register for receiv-
ing GNodes updates. Note g: Based on the P-Node configuration
matrix and the control word, the G-Node provides a recommenda-
tion regarding which of the P-Nodes can attempt to transmit. And
accordingly, the P-Nodes will use the data channel to transmit the
measured data without any loss. The algorithm explained in this
section can be scalable to multiple numbers of P-Nodes.
6.9 Summary
In this chapter, the basic connectivity model is described, which con-
sists of the G-Node, the P-Cloud, and the P-Node. Once the basic
connectivity model is identified as the core communication system
unit, other possible connectivity types can be developed. They in-
clude multiple ways to establish connectivity with the P-Cloud, the
local P-Cloud connectivity model, the G-Node as a gateway model,
a standalone configuration, and a hybrid configuration, and then the
use of well-known secure servers such as Blackberry Enterprise Server
and a model using the G-Node as a secure gateway to the P-Cloud.
The POCT system definition, based on the connectivity model, was
developed as type 1, type 2, and type 3. The type classifications help
to define the QoS levels as required by the user community. For ease
of deployment of the POCT system, a hierarchical model view was
presented. The hierarchical model starts from the basic POCT unit
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and the developing POCT sites, POCT zones, and the POCT sys-
tems. The hierarchical model view presents the practical approach
to linking multiple POCT systems, which include connectivity using
the established layer 2.5 protocol MPLS.
A concept of creating an ecosystem for ongoing maintenance and de-
velopment of the POCT system was developed. The interaction of
multiple business units needed in developing the POCT system was
developed. Configuration models for connecting with the commer-
cially available cloud were developed by mapping the basic core sys-
tem model, which consists of P-Node, G-Node, and P-Cloud. Simula-
tion of key network models was carried out, and the results obtained
are shown and discussed. An innovative process of managing the net-
work traffic congestion was developed, and the algorithm framework
was designed. This framework can be used by application developers
to incorporate congestion control in the P-Node application.
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Conclusion and Future work
7.1 Conclusion
This section summarizes the fulfillment of the research objectives
established for this project and concludes with a summary and a
description of additional research that will extend the solutions sug-
gested by the present project.
The objectives set at the beginning of the research have been ac-
complished by creating development methodology processes (require-
ment modelling to an actual working system) that validate the im-
plementation of functionalities for the POCT system. The require-
ment elicitation process used to identify the functionalities was a
non-traditional method of representing the requirements. The pyra-
mid requirements process, along with the use of the Use Case Maps
(UCM), was used to identify the communication systems key re-
quirements. This is the only methodology that provides measurable
attributes to the requirements, which helps to create the predictable
system. The requirements methodology ensures that the key perfor-
mance indices (KPIs) and required user experiences are met.
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For the architecture design, the UCM modelling methodology was
used, which links the necessary requirements to the system architec-
ture. The UCM is a powerful system modelling tool with the ability
to generate test cases. It provides actual use cases and data flow
related to the requirements and helps to provide an end-to-end view
of work packages needed for the project, which assists the researcher
and the team in providing a realistic plan for project execution.
Building a communication design for securely interconnecting the
system building blocks had many challenges: scoping the require-
ments, choosing the development of the methodology and testing
process, and the managing of the end-to-end development. The sys-
tem design strategy was developed in order to implement the com-
munication system, from the concept to a functional system.
A modularized system architecture was developed to realize the com-
munication of the system. The architecture consists of independent
subsystems, developed using open source hardware modules. The
modularized architecture allows the system to be developed using
in-house components or modules available from a 3rd party vendor,
depending upon the need and scope of the device. The key assump-
tion is that the modules provide services via well-defined application-
specific interfaces (APIs) for other modules using the services.
Because of the fast pace of changes in the medical world, it is im-
portant that the changes in the assay processes are reflected in the
system, so that the patient can benefit from the latest changes by
using up-to-date software systems. One way to reduce the shipment
time or time to market is to have a testing process that finds any
critical system software bugs quickly, with a minimum set of smart
test vectors. The process of generating the intelligent test vectors is
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called Combinatorial Design methodology, which is explained with
sample results in Chapter 2.
The standard IEC 62304 helped to classify the key architectural sys-
tems to be developed based on the three classes for software safety as
defined in the standard. The key accept in the standard is the trace-
ability concept: the requirements, development and testing must
be aligned so that any risks can be mitigated. Compliance to the
standard has many advantages, including faster approval of certi-
fication from FDA and subsequent recertification for software up-
grades. For accomplishing IEC 62304 compliance, it is vital that the
requirements for developing the system have no ambiguities. The
EARS methodology discussed in Chapter 3 provides a solid foun-
dation for the requirements needed to build a complete system. It
is recommended that any future development or enhancement re-
quests should start with proper requirements statements based on
the EARS methodology and supported by the UCM diagrams. Hav-
ing the requirements analysis at the beginning of the process will
save project costs by 30-40 percentage, and eliminate any risks with
the system development.
The wireless communication world is always changing. Yet the com-
munication system for the devices requires great stability, due to the
mission critical functionality. With the ongoing discussion of 5G de-
ployment, it is predicted that there will be 1.4B 5G connections by
the year 2025 [152]. The actual definition of 5G itself is still evolv-
ing. The existing radio access technologies such as LTE (4G) also is
still developing. In light of these constant changes in wireless com-
munication technologies, it is important to have the communication
protocol developed independently of the radio access technologies.
The developed protocol is at the application layer level of the OSI
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model. The communication protocol details have been stated in
Chapter 3.
Security plays an important role, an essential aspect of the commu-
nication system architecture. Several salient operational use cases
for securing communication between multiple system components
in the context of system communication were presented. Data in-
tegrity must be maintained at all times: accessing the device by the
authorized user, operating the tests process by the authorized user,
accruing measurement data during the tests, data transmission after
the test and data storage in the P-Cloud. Chapter 4 outlines two
kinds of security methodologies: challenge and response-based and
behavioural- based. The challenge and response-based methodology
uses the OPCODEs defined in the communication protocol (Chap-
ter 3) to establish the authentication and authorization access of the
device. The behavioural-based methodology makes use of secondary
attributes or metadata of the measured data. Both the methods can
be used in accordance with an encryption scheme commercially avail-
able or proprietary schemes. The POCT systems are characterized
as Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication systems. Providing
security in the context of the M2M is complex because multiple stake-
holders are participating. All the stakeholders, MODEM (communi-
cation chip) vendors, device makers, network providers, application
developers and device users must be coordinated for the successful
operation of system deployment.
A P-Cloud architecture was developed with multiple types of seg-
regated data that are relevant to the communication system. The
architecture is agnostic to multiple vendor cloud technologies. Using
the NAS technology is one way of constructing a private P-Cloud. It
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needs to be designed to meet the HIPAA conformance for data pri-
vacy. The multiple types of data in each class are handled separately
in the proposed architecture. Managing QoS of the data was shown
in the context of the NAS, to accomplish bandwidth requirements.
The details are in Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 explains network models for the communication system.
The possibilities of connectivity configurations were developed. There
are three types of communities of system configurations designed to
accomplish QoS SLAs. All the three types of configuration connect
to the P-Cloud. A hierarchical system was designed for controlling
information flow based on network policies. Concepts of the unit,
sites, zones and system were created to manage the data privacy
and related policies. Development and system maintenance strategy
was formulated to manage large-scale deployments. Simulation of
the network connectivity was carried out using the NS3 simulator.
A new congestion control algorithm for managing data transmission
was developed.
Agile project management methodology was used to manage the on-
going system development with multiple stakeholders. This provides
the faster adaptability for meeting the requirements in the system,
as POCT is becoming a standard of care in many diagnostic situ-
ations when the patient is unable to get treatment on time due to
inaccessibility of labs in their locations.
Designing of the POCT requires a different approach than a usual
system development methodology, as it is a mission critical commu-
nication system. A new development process using the IEC62304
standard has been established, which includes: requirement elicit-
ing, system partitioning, software coding process and a smart way of
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testing the system. Following these processes results in an error-free
system. Unambiguous system requirements are vital in managing
the development of the POCT communication system. A new ap-
proach to combining the UCM and the EARS methodologies for
understanding the system specification was developed successfully.
This approach captures the intention of the specifications for multi-
ple stakeholders: project managers, implementers and system verifi-
cation and validation teams, in terms of easily understandable arte-
facts. The communication protocol developed is independent of the
wireless radio access technologies. It is scalable for use with modifi-
cation to existing assays and future assay processing.
Security of data transmission is a critical need for safeguarding the
patients test data. The security of the POCT devices communica-
tion needed a threat modelling process to develop a suitable security
mechanism in the context of the POCT system. Multiple stakehold-
ers are involved in a practical system deployment scenario: device
users, network vendors, wireless operators, application developers
and device manufacturers. Coordination of all the key parties is
needed to build a secure communication system. Two new secu-
rity mechanisms were developed to meet the challenges of complex
security needs. The secure data storage for the patient data is a
necessary element in the system. The storage needs to be used for
multiple purposes: diagnosing the patient condition, data analytics,
device status, system deployment and device operation. A new way
of creating cloud storage was developed. Also, there is the need to
have a private cloud system with low cost components. The NAS
was developed to demonstrate the private cloud application.
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Deploying multiple POCT systems is crucial to the success of reach-
ing out to the beneficiaries of the system, such as patients and health-
care providers. The system must be scalable as the demand grows.
Therefore, a scalable communication system architecture is needed
that is capable of configurable QoS attributes at various system usage
points. A hierarchical model interconnecting network architectures
was developed to meet the needs of the cost-effective system with
scalability. There is no limitation to scale a basic system unit to
the large-scale system using the hierarchical model developed. This
method also helps to analyze communication interface compatibil-
ities using simple hexogen diagrams. Congestion control is one of
the key features during system expansion. Congestion control algo-
rithms were developed for use when multiple POCT devices attempt
to transfer test data to the P-Cloud.
The new processes and systems developed during this research project
have an impact on key ideas presented: technology independent com-
munication protocol, system requirement gathering, system testing,
secure communication links specific to the POCT context, securely
partitioned data storage (P-Cloud), unlimited scalable network com-
munication model, and congestion control.
7.2 Future Work
There are multiple applications, challenges and opportunities in the
area of POCT communication which are explained in the following
section. These items form the future work area for system commu-
nication and data security.
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7.2.1 Data aggregation of multiple P-Clouds
Figure 7.1: Policy framework engine
As shown in Figure 7.1, the aggregation of P-Clouds in multiple sites
is beneficial in analyzing the collected data for building an under-
standing of the spread of certain health conditions, including im-
proving the design of future systems, using machine learning-based
data analytics.
Consider a scenario that is depicted in Chapter 5, where the P-Cloud
was realized using the NAS unit. It is located within the firewall as a
private cloud. Multiple system sites will have multiple P-Clouds that
need to be interconnected to have aggregated information, as shown
in Figure 7.1. For example, if there are four independent databases
from four different agencies, they will face the issue of linking some or
all the attributes from each of the four databases. A simple solution
would be to create a policy engine framework that helps to aggregate
data attributes from the four databases.
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A policy engine framework is shown in Figure 7.1, which may be
a possible strategy for solving data aggregation from multiple data
sources. The policy engine framework consists of a policy server, a
user interface for creating and modifying policies and an aggregated
database. The aggregated database can be developed as a Hadoop
container (big data) where the big data search engine algorithms can
be applied to generate stories around the data from the four data
sources.
The goal is to get the desired data attributes from the four databases
into a common aggregated database. The policy server controls in-
formation flow (i.e., only the attributes that are allowed by config-
ured policies at interface level) from the databases to the aggregated
database. Each database is associated with a policy agent or a policy
client that consults the policy server before the data is transmitted
to the aggregated database. The policy agents get updated policy
information from the policy server, based on the policies configured.
Note that the policy server is a centralized entity in the architecture.
Investigation of suitable policy agents or some other methods can be
taken up as an extension of this work.
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7.2.2 Architecture for POCT Mobile station unit and data privacy
Figure 7.2: Lancet-2014 report
The Lancet (2014) has published a study on the leading causes of
lost years of life, worldwide. According to the study, the primary
reason for the loss of life in African countries is HIV (AIDS) and
malaria diseases [153]. The World Health Organization reports that
almost 45.8 percentage of member states have less than one doctor
per 1000 population [154]. Most of the member states are in African
countries (Figure 7.2). Given the situation, testing offers an efficient
path to reach a higher doctor-patient percentage population.
The deployment of the POCT system in countries such as those in
Africa helps to provide efficient healthcare services to compact loss of
lives due to spreading diseases. The POCT system is a data-centric
system, and it needs Internet connectivity (IPv4 / IPv6 connectiv-
ity) for sending test data to a secure cloud or smartphone. The IPv4
/ IPv6 depends on bearer services (rules and policies for providing
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Figure 7.3: Bearer Services for POCT
testing service, including QoS attributes), which are needed for the
system deployments. The bearer has an endpoint IP address (Figure
7.3). The system deployment operation assumes that all the instal-
lations support private IP addresses. This is one of the minimum
requirements needed for system deployment. Lack of IP addresses
will create practical IP address sharing issues which will prevent suc-
cessful deployments.
The IPv4 address space is insufficient in African countries (e.g., In
Nigeria, 80 people share one IP address, and in Congo, 92 people
share one IPv4 address) (Figure 7.4) [155]. The address spaces have
been consumed by the growth in mobile data traffic, deployment of
data session-hungry applications consuming multiple IP connectivi-
ties and growth in M2M communication.
These factors contribute to the limitation issue with private IPv4
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Figure 7.4: IP address usage in African countries
addresses. It will take few years to deploy IPv6-based services. Man-
agement of coexistence between IPv4 and IPv6-based services can be
a challenge, too, because of the network carrier infrastructure config-
urations. Therefore an intermittent solution, which is scalable and
coexists with future IPv6 deployments, is needed. Network address
translation (NAT)-based solutions may be considered to manage the
IP address space crisis, which helps multiple users sharing one single
public IPv4 address (Figure 7.5).
Future research may consider modifications to the deployment sce-
narios modelled in Chapter 6 and study the impact due to the so-
lutions such as NAT. A Deep Learning network model could be the
next step in the process of solving the challenges such as lack of an
IP address.
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Figure 7.5: NAT Based Solution
7.2.3 Modification and expanding POCT protocol with USSD
Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) technology is a
set of functional codes which are used by the GSM phones[156]. The
USSD can be adopted for many services that are offered by the net-
work providers. The POCT can be treated as a service provided
by the network operator in setting up a secure connection from the
device via the G-Node to the cloud server. The protocol described
in Chapter 3 could be modified to incorporate the USSD for com-
munication at the application layer.
7.2.4 Developing common data standard for multi-vendor P-Clouds
There are three primary vendors for the cloud platform today, Ama-
zon, Microsoft, and Google. A cloud architecture with data segre-
gation can be implemented using the commercially available cloud
technologies. There are propriety cloud infrastructures used across
the industry. It is essential to develop a standard data format for hav-
ing end-to-end data usage and interoperability. Use of well-known
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industry standard cloud infrastructures provide trusted and secure
P-Clouds. The AI-based algorithms may be developed to find corre-
lations between the multi-vendors cloud deployments for interfacing
the system with all the cloud vendors seamlessly.
7.2.5 Security algorithms for dynamic adaptation
The security algorithm models described in the research may have
weaknesses in compacting the security threats surfacing almost daily
in the cybersecurity world. It is possible to develop a dynamically
evolving threat model that shows the weakness against the current
security mechanisms and models implemented. Investigating the
reuse of other known security countermeasures in such a way that
mitigation of any new threats can be managed with the dynamic
threat model is a topic for future research.
The security mechanism developed needs to be tested with a full set
of devices, and the existing thread model can be evaluated with new
security information. The impacts due to the recent findings of secu-
rity violations within the processing units such as Spectre Attacks (
Exploiting Speculative Execution [157]) are to be investigated. Any
dependency on the low layers of the communication protocol stack
could be considered.
7.2.6 Connected homes and the POCT systems
Interfacing of the POCT system with connected home technologies
consisting of an external 5G communication backhaul with an inter-
nal Internet router connectivity could be investigated. The POCT
can be a special application in these environments with special per-
formance indices. This may impact the network models analyzed in
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the research. This investigation would be a value-added project for
all stakeholders.
The research has come up with a framework uses the communica-
tion protocol which is independent of radio access technology (RAT),
meaning the communication protocol will work with future RAT
technologies. The research came out processes and methodologies:
creating meaningful requirements to solve the problems, system de-
sign methodology for building loosely coupled systems, security prin-
ciples needed for data privacy, applying the IEC62304 for system
partitioning, the combinatorial methods for a smart way of testing
the system and using Agile project development processes. These
are significant outcomes in the methodology and procedures for de-
veloping the POCT device communication but also other medical
devices in general. Expressing the requirements without any ambi-
guity is vital to have an error-free system. The new methodology
which combines the UCM model and the EARS requirement syntax
provides a unique way of expressing the requirements for mission
critical system not only suitable for POCT development but also
applicable to other mission critical system development in medicine.
The communication protocol that evolved from the research is ideal
for medical devices which need to execute multiple assays or proce-
dures. The cloud architecture conforms to HIPPA compliance, and
the medical systems that need to store medical data can adopt this
architecture. The existing commercially available cloud systems can
be configured to model the architecture developed. The hierarchical
network system designed in the research can be used for managing
all kind of IoT systems and medical devices with limitless types of
communication technologies.
This research aims to impact the monitoring and early diagnosis
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of infectious diseases in low-resource, low-income developing coun-
tries. This critical issue depends on the collaborative efforts of many,
healthcare specialists, technologists, physicians, and others who are
committed to improving healthcare delivery in low-resource, low-
income developing countries. This researchers desire is that this
project provides forward momentum in the development of a health
delivery system that is capable of executing the assays in distant
locations to detect infectious diseases.
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